American University Law Review
Volume 57 | Issue 4

Article 5

2008

Mary Ellen Coster Williams

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Government Contracts Commons
Recommended Citation
Williams, Mary Ellen C. “2007 Government Contract Decisions of the Federal Circuit.” American University Law Review 57, no.4
(April 2008): 1075-1143.

This Area Summary is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Keywords

Government Contracts, Federal Circuit, Jurisdiction, Bid Protests, Contract interpretation, Equitable
Adjustment, Breach, Contract Termination, Damages, Set-Off, Attorney Fees

This area summary is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol57/iss4/5

2007 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
*

THE HONORABLE MARY ELLEN COSTER WILLIAMS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction.......................................................................................1077
I. Jurisdiction...............................................................................1077
A. Suburban Mortgage Associates, Inc. v. United States
Department of Housing & Urban Development, 480
F.3d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ...............................................1077
B. Bianchi v. United States, 475 F.3d 1268
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1082
C. Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds and Insurance Agency,
Inc. v. Department of Homeland Security, 490 F.3d
940 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .........................................................1085
D. National American Insurance Co. v. United States, 498
F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ...............................................1086
II. Bid Protests ..............................................................................1088
A. Chapman Law Firm Co. v. Greenleaf Construction
Co., 490 F.3d 934 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ..................................1088
B. Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1090
C. Avtel Services, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1259
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1091
III. Contract Interpretation ..........................................................1092
A. Winter v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 503 F.3d 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1092
IV. Equitable Adjustment/Breach................................................1094
A. Renda Marine v. United States, 509 F.3d 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1094
* Judge, United States Court of Federal Claims, appointed July 2003. J.D.,
1977, Duke University School of Law; M.A./B.A., 1974, Catholic University of America.
These summaries reflect the personal views of the author, and they may not be cited
as precedent. The author gratefully acknowledges the significant contributions of
her law clerk Patrick T. Rothwell, as well as interns Margaret J. Kochuba and Nicole
P. Femminella, to this Article.

1075

1076

V.
VI.
VII.

VIII.

IX.
X.

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1075

B. ACE Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 499 F.3d 1357
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1097
1. Profilographic testing of concrete paving .................1097
2. Concrete paving ..........................................................1098
3. Differing site condition ..............................................1099
C. ConocoPhillips v. United States, 501 F.3d 1374
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1099
D. North Star Steel Co. v. United States, 477 F.3d 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1102
Termination.............................................................................1105
A. Ryste & Ricas, Inc. v. Harvey, 477 F.3d 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1105
Authority ..................................................................................1107
A. Winter v. Cath-dr/Balti Joint Venture, 497 F.3d 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1107
Damages...................................................................................1112
A. Citizens Federal Bank v. United States, 474 F.3d 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1112
B. Hughes v. United States, 498 F.3d 1334
(Fed Cir. 2007) .................................................................1115
C. Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Wynne, 497 F.3d 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1117
D. International Data Products Corp. v. United States,
492 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ........................................1119
Defenses ...................................................................................1122
A. Carabetta Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 482 F.3d
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .......................................................1122
B. City Line Joint Venture v. United States, 503 F.3d 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1124
C. Long Island Savings Bank, FSB v. United States, 503
F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ...............................................1127
1. The contract................................................................1128
2. LISB CEO’s law firm compensation...........................1129
3. FIRREA and the investigation of Conway’s
kickback scheme .........................................................1130
4. Court of Federal Claims proceeding..........................1131
5. Federal common law fraud.........................................1132
6. Prior material breach..................................................1135
Set-Off ......................................................................................1136
A. J.G.B. Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 497 F.3d 1259
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1136
Attorney Fees ...........................................................................1137
A. Hubbard v. United States, 480 F.3d 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1137
B. Centex Corp. v. United States, 486 F.3d 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); First Heights Bank, FSB v. United States,
486 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ........................................1140

2008]

2007 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS

1077

C. Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff, 482 F.3d 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................1141
Conclusion .........................................................................................1142
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the Federal Circuit issued 326 precedential opinions. Of
these, thirty-seven were contract cases on appeal from the Court of
Federal Claims and five were appeals in Contracts Disputes Act
(“CDA”) cases from the boards of contract appeals. This Article
discusses twenty-six precedent-setting opinions involving government
contract law issues, setting forth the relevant facts, the Federal
Circuit’s analysis, and, where appropriate, the ramifications of these
1
cases. The decisions are grouped into the following categories:
jurisdiction, bid protests, contract interpretation, equitable
adjustment/breach, termination, authority, damages, defenses, setoff, and attorney fees.
I. JURISDICTION
A. Suburban Mortgage Associates, Inc. v. United States Department of
Housing & Urban Development, 480 F.3d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
In this significant opinion, the Federal Circuit clarified the
2
jurisdictional boundary between the Tucker Act and the
3
4
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). This interlocutory appeal
addressed the district court’s denial of the government’s motion to
transfer the case to the Court of Federal Claims (“COFC”). The
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal of such a
5
transfer order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A).
The dispute arose from a nursing home’s default on a mortgage
loan guaranteed by the Department of Housing and Urban
1. This Article addresses all Federal Circuit precedential opinions in contract
actions for 2007.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2000).
4. Suburban Mortgage Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480
F.3d 1116, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
5. This provides:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from an interlocutory order of a district
court of the United States, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of
the Virgin Islands, or the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands,
granting or denying, in whole or in part, a motion to transfer an action to
the United States Court of Federal Claims under section 1631 [transfer to
cure for want of jurisdiction] of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A) (2000).
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6

In this guaranty arrangement, HUD
Development (“HUD”).
became obligated to reimburse Suburban Mortgage if the nursing
7
The
home defaulted and Suburban Mortgage incurred losses.
parties’ agreement dictated that in the event of a default, Suburban
Mortgage had to transfer its interest in the mortgage and the
mortgaged property to HUD in order to collect the insurance
8
proceeds.
The nursing home defaulted on its mortgage loan, and Suburban
Mortgage sought to exercise its contractual right by assigning the
defaulted mortgage to HUD, thereafter collecting the insurance
9
proceeds. HUD refused to accept assignment based on its belief that
Suburban Mortgage committed fraud or made material
10
misrepresentations to secure the guaranty agreement.
Suburban Mortgage filed suit in the District Court for the District
of Columbia. In Count I, Suburban Mortgage sought a declaratory
judgment requiring HUD to perform its duties under the agreement,
i.e., “to accept assignment of the loan with ultimate reimbursement
11
of the loan balance to Suburban.” In Count II, it sought specific
performance “in the form of payment of the insured loan amount”
12
and other related expenses. Suburban Mortgage invoked the Fifth
Amendment and three statutory bases for the subject-matter
13
jurisdiction of the district court—“federal question” jurisdiction, the
14
15
Administrative Procedure Act, and the Declaratory Judgment Act.
16
The district court, citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, concluded that it
had jurisdiction because Suburban Mortgage sought equitable
17
relief. Furthermore, the district court determined that the COFC
could not provide adequate relief, reasoning that even though
Suburban Mortgage could largely reduce its claims to a monetary
sum, only injunctive relief could address the concerns of bankruptcy,
18
The district court
loss of reputation, and lost future profits.
6. Suburban Mortgage, 480 F.3d at 1118.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1118–19.
10. Id. at 1119. HUD’s allegations of fraud revolved around an individual under
indictment who HUD believed owned or controlled both Suburban Mortgage and
the nursing home. HUD contended that this owner caused the failure of the nursing
home in order to fraudulently collect the insurance proceeds. Id. at 1119 n.6.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
14. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2000).
15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2000).
16. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
17. Suburban Mortgage, 480 F.3d at 1120.
18. Id.
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dismissed Suburban Mortgage’s claims for specific performance
because they sounded in contract, but sustained Suburban
Mortgage’s claim for declaratory relief on the ground that
Suburban’s challenge to HUD’s refusal to accept assignment of the
mortgage flowed from statute, not the underlying insurance
19
contract.
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by examining the
fundamental precept of sovereign immunity, articulating the
requirement that a claimant identify a specific statutory waiver of
20
immunity in order to bring suit against the government. The court
laid out the statutory framework governing non-tort claims against
the government, citing the Tucker Act’s grant of jurisdiction over
monetary claims to the COFC, and the APA’s grant of jurisdiction to
21
the district courts for review of agency action.
The court explained that Congress reconciled the Tucker Act and
the APA by providing in the APA the three specific limitations on the
jurisdictional reach of the APA—first, the suit may only seek relief
other than “money damages,” second, a suit would lie under the APA
only if there were “no other adequate remedy” in a court, and third,
the suit could not be maintained if “any other statute that grants
consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is
22
sought.”
Using colorful language, the Federal Circuit described the first
APA limitation—the APA’s inapplicability to suits for money—as a
relatively “watertight barrier” until the Supreme Court’s 1988
decision in Bowen caused that barrier to spring a leak “that has
23
threatened to become a gusher.” Bowen held that the district court
had APA jurisdiction over a state’s claim that an action to compel
payment of Medicaid expenditures did not seek money damages, but
rather sought to “enforce the statutory mandate itself, which happens
24
to be one for the payment of money.”
Recognizing that Bowen created confusion and forum shopping,
the Federal Circuit noted that in determining jurisdiction, looking
25
beyond the pleadings to the substance of the claim was necessary.
Citing a litany of Federal Circuit opinions harking back to 1994, the
court emphasized: “We have cautioned litigants that dressing up a
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 1120–21.
Id. at 1121.
Id. at 1121–22.
Id. at 1122 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2000)).
Id.
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 900 (1988).
Suburban Mortgage, 480 F.3d at 1124.
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claim for money as one for equitable relief will not remove the claim
26
from Tucker Act jurisdiction and make it an APA case.”
After denuding a claim to its essence, the Suburban Mortgage court
directed that the court “still must determine whether the claim is
excluded from APA jurisdiction by the limitations in 5 U.S.C. §§ 702
27
and 704.” However, in tackling this aspect of the case, the Circuit
departed from Bowen and its progeny’s analytical approach. Instead
of attempting to divine whether a claim is for “money damages” or
“happens to be for money”⎯“a distinction . . . at best murky, and at
worst without a difference”⎯the Federal Circuit readjusted the Bowen
28
methodology. In charting a different course, the Federal Circuit
deferred the inquiry on whether relief sought was for money damages
29
vel non to a later, perhaps unnecessary phase of the analysis.
Instead, the Federal Circuit directed that the first step in the
inquiry should be to ascertain whether the Court of Federal Claims
30
could provide an adequate remedy for the alleged wrong.
The
Court concluded that if the complaint sought a monetary reward
from the government and the Court of Federal Claims could provide
an adequate remedy, then the proper forum would be the COFC
under the Tucker Act. In this scenario, there would be no need to
address the “money damages” and the “expressly or impliedly
31
forbids” provisions. Since “[t]he three limitations function in the
disjunctive, the application of any one is enough to deny a district
32
court jurisdiction under the APA.”
Applying this analytical framework, the court held that although
Suburban Mortgage’s claim was fashioned as one for declaratory and
injunctive relief, the substance of the claim was for monetary relief
33
under a contract-based obligation of HUD. The court determined
that the COFC could provide an adequate remedy because the
monetary relief claimed in the district court was available through a
34
breach-of-contract claim in the COFC.
In discussing the adequacy of Suburban Mortgage’s remedy in the
COFC, the Federal Circuit recognized that unlike Bowen, Suburban
Mortgage sought a single payment of the insurance proceeds. In
distinguishing Bowen, the Circuit articulated a litany of circumstances
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1125.
Id.
Id. at 1125 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000)).
Id. at 1126.
Id.
Id. at 1127.
Id. at 1128.
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in Bowen that were not at play in Suburban. Specifically, Bowen
involved the complex relationship between two sovereigns⎯the
federal and state governments⎯in administering the Medicaid
35
program, a dispute over a major federal grant involving enormous
sums of money, the complex interactions between the governments
and the beneficiaries, and the long-term functioning of the program
against the backdrop of the statutory requirements governing the
36
Medicaid program. As the Circuit noted, nowhere in Bowen did the
Court refer to a specific express agreement governing the parties’
37
relationships.
Suburban Mortgage is a watershed decision that should do much to
eliminate wasteful litigation on the jurisdictional divide between
district courts and the COFC. One district court has already applied
Suburban Mortgage to “plug the leak” in the “money distinction”
barrier separating district court APA jurisdiction from COFC Tucker
38
39
Act jurisdiction.
In Tortorella v. United States, the court
characterized Suburban Mortgage as “aptly summariz[ing] the current
40
state of the law as it pertains to Bowen” and limiting Bowen. The
Tortorella court, using a different Suburban Mortgage metaphor, stated,
“No matter what dressing plaintiffs serve with the Amended
Complaint, the taste is overwhelmingly that of a money award.
Recognizing as much, plaintiffs in essence concede that most of their
41
case belongs in the Court of Federal Claims.”
35. Suburban Mortgage, 480 F.3d at 1124 (citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S.
879, 884–85 (1988); Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 247
F.3d 1378, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
36. Id. at 1127.
37. Id. The Federal Circuit gave short shrift to plaintiff’s other arguments,
stating:
Nor are Suburban’s concerns about possible bankruptcy, loss of reputation,
and lost future profits a basis for saying that there is not an adequate remedy
in the Court of Federal Claims. Those concerns can be alleged by any
claimant seeking money from the Government for an allegedly wrongful
failure to pay a claim; to the extent they have merit in a given case, money
usually can assuage the wrong.
Id.
38. Tortorella v. United States, 486 F. Supp. 2d 159, 163–64 (D. Mass. 2007).
39. 486 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D. Mass. 2007).
40. Id. at 163.
41. Id. at 164. Commentators characterized the significance of Suburban Mortgage
from a practitioner’s point of view as follows:
The importance of the case to practitioners is three-fold. First, the Federal
Circuit does not disguise its disagreement with Bowen or its intent to limit
Bowen to its fairly unique circumstances. Second, the court is critical of
attempts by lawyers to craft claims for relief so as to avoid the COFC. Third,
adequacy of remedy at the COFC often will be the deciding factor. In this
regard, the court also notes its position that money damages under the
Tucker Act are “presumptively an adequate remedy.”
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B. Bianchi v. United States, 475 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
42

In Bianchi v. United States (Bianchi IV), a contractor sought
recovery for two sets of “value engineering change proposal”
(“VECP”) payments awarded to it by the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (“ASBCA”), but paid by the government to a bank
43
as contractor’s assignee. The Federal Circuit noted that this case
had a “long and tortuous history” originating in claims filed before
44
the ASBCA in 1981. In 1979 and 1980, Mr. Bianchi entered into
45
three contracts to produce military clothing for the government.
Bianchi used loans from Bank of America (“the Bank”) to finance his
performance of the contract, assigning the proceeds and contractual
46
rights to the Bank as security for these loans, some of which the
47
When the
Small Business Administration (“SBA”) guaranteed.
government terminated the contracts, Bianchi defaulted on the
48
loans, and the Bank applied to the SBA for payment on the
guaranteed loans. In exchange for payment, the Bank assigned its
49
interest in the guaranteed loans to the SBA.
The contractor alleged that the failure of the government to pay
him constituted a breach of a 1988 settlement agreement between
50
him and the government. The COFC held that it lacked subject51
matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, the contractor made three
arguments. First, he argued that the COFC erred in dismissing for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because he predicated his claims
52
on a breach of a settlement agreement. Second, he argued that the
COFC erred in finding that his VECP I claim was time-barred under
53
the statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Third, Bianchi argued
that under the principle of res judicata, prior holdings in the Federal
Circuit and Ninth Circuit established that the 1988 settlement
C. Stanley Dees & Thomas C. Papson, Availability of COFC Remedy Precludes APA Review
of Dispute Over Mortgage Guarantee, Federal Circuit Holds, GOV’T CONTRACTOR, Mar. 28,
2007, at 12, 15.
42. 475 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
43. In February 1993, the ASBCA awarded Bianchi VECP royalties in the amount
of $58,613.03 plus interest (“VECP I”). In December 2000, the ASBCA awarded
Bianchi royalties in the amount of $16,574.74 plus interest (“VECP II”). The
government, however, never paid these sums to Bianchi. Id. at 1271–72.
44. Id. at 1270.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1273.
51. Id. at 1272.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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agreement required the government to pay the VECP awards to him
54
personally.
In 1981, Bianchi brought claims related to the contracts before the
55
ASBCA, and in 1988, Bianchi and the government reached a
settlement agreement allowing Bianchi to recover $1.1 million and
permitting him to pursue his VECP claims and seek legal fees before
56
the ASBCA. However, the Bank believed that as Bianchi’s contract
57
The Bank
assignee, it should have received the $1.1 million.
brought this argument to the COFC, and in response, the
government filed a third-party claim against Bianchi for the money
58
he received under the settlement agreement in 1988. On appeal,
the Federal Circuit sided with the Bank in Bank of America National
59
Trust & Savings Association v. United States (Bianchi I), holding that
the SBA’s security interest in the contract was subordinate to the
60
Bank’s rights. Furthermore, the government had no right to set off
Bianchi’s debts to the SBA against the money owed to it by the
61
Bank. Under the terms of the 1988 settlement agreement, then, the
62
government could not challenge its settlement with Bianchi.
In 1993, the ASBCA awarded Bianchi recovery on his VECP I claim
63
in the form of royalties. After Bianchi filed for a writ of mandamus
to compel the government to pay its VECP I award, the district court
64
found that the Bank as assignee was entitled to the VECP royalties.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Bianchi argued that the 1988
settlement agreement entitled him to the VECP I royalties using the
65
Federal Circuit’s decision in Bianchi I. According to Bianchi, it was
66
irrelevant whether the government also owed royalties to the Bank.
However, because the case essentially involved a breach of contract
(the 1988 settlement agreement) claim against the United States, the
Ninth Circuit found that the district court lacked jurisdiction,
67
holding that the claim instead belonged in the COFC.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1270–71.
Id. at 1271.
Id.
23 F.3d 380, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Bianchi IV, 475 F.3d at 1271.
Bianchi I, 23 F.3d at 384–85.
Id. at 383.
Bianchi v. United States (Bianchi III), 68 Fed. Cl. 442, 443 (2005).
Bianchi v. Walker (Bianchi II), 163 F.3d 564 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 569.
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In 2000, the ASBCA awarded Bianchi his VECP II royalties. Then,
in 2004, Bianchi filed suit in the COFC, claiming that the 1988
settlement agreement entitled him to both the VECP I and VECP II
69
The COFC agreed that the settlement agreement
awards.
constituted a contract. Generally, the COFC has jurisdiction over
contract disputes involving the U.S. government, but nonetheless the
court dismissed Bianchi’s case, explaining that it was “an improper
70
attempt to enforce ASBCA awards in the COFC” and that the statute
71
of limitations on the VECP I claim had expired.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Bianchi argued that the 1988
settlement agreement was an express contract, and therefore the
72
COFC had jurisdiction. The government argued that Bianchi had
not initially raised a breach-of-contract claim—an argument that
73
required the Federal Circuit to parse Bianchi’s COFC complaint.
The court noted that Court of Federal Claims Rule 8(a)(2),
governing pleadings, requires only a short and plain statement of a
74
claim giving the defendant “fair notice” of the claim, a standard that
75
Therefore, the COFC had
Bianchi’s complaint sufficiently met.
jurisdiction—at least as to the claim of a breach of the 1988
76
settlement agreement.
In reviewing the COFC’s dismissal of Bianchi’s VECP I claims on
the separate ground that they were time-barred under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2501, which sets forth a six-year statute of limitations, the Federal
Circuit held that “all events ha[d] occurred to fix the government’s
alleged liability” by 1993, when the ASBCA awarded the royalties to
77
Bianchi. The court rejected Bianchi’s argument that the cause of
action did not arise until 1999, when, after the decision in Bianchi II,
78
the Bank received the royalties instead of Bianchi.
Because the
cause of action with respect to the VECP I claims accrued more than
six years before Bianchi filed suit in 2004, the court affirmed the

68. See Bianchi v. United States (Bianchi IV), 475 F.3d 1268, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(recounting this phase of the case’s procedural history).
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Bianchi v. United States (Bianchi III), 68 Fed. Cl. 442, 450 (2005)).
71. Id. (citing Bianchi III, 68 Fed. Cl. at 452).
72. Id. at 1273.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1273–74.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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COFC’s ruling that the VECP I claims were time-barred and the
79
COFC lacked jurisdiction over them.
C. Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds and Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Department
of Homeland Security, 490 F.3d 940 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
In Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds and Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Department
80
of Homeland Security, the Federal Circuit vacated a district court order
transferring to the COFC plaintiff’s claims seeking cancellation of
immigration bonds, finding that such claims were not Tucker Act
81
According to its Fourth Amended
claims for monetary relief.
82
Complaint, plaintiff sought, under the Little Tucker Act, monetary
damages, in the form of cancellation of debt, against the Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”), which allegedly had “breached a
substantial number of immigration bond contracts with [Gonzales]
by failing to comply with its contractual, legal and/or procedural
83
obligations/requirements.” The district court found that the claims
sought monetary damages in excess of $10,000, and transferred
84
Gonzales’ complaint to the COFC.
The district court determined that Gonzales’ claims for debt
cancellation were functionally equivalent to claims for money
79. Id. at 1274–75. Subsequent to this decision, the Supreme Court in John R.
Sand & Gravel v. United States, No. 06-1164, slip. op. (U.S. Jan. 8, 2008), addressed the
question of whether § 2501 is jurisdictional. Applying stare decisis and reaffirming a
series of cases dating from the 19th century, the Court answered this question in the
affirmative and held that § 2501 serves as a limitation on the scope of the waiver of
sovereign immunity and on the jurisdiction of the COFC. Id. at 8. The Court found
that § 2501 was jurisdictional rather than a waivable affirmative defense because it
was a “more absolute[] kind of limitation period” that “seek[s] not so much to
protect a defendant’s case-specific interest in timeliness as to achieve a broader
system-related goal, such as facilitating the administration of claims.” Id. at 2–3. This
decision has practical ramifications—requiring a plaintiff to prove the timeliness of
its action as part and parcel of establishing jurisdiction, and requiring courts to
consider compliance with the statute of limitations sua sponte.
The Federal Circuit issued another decision in 2007 which interpreted § 2501 in
the context of a Winstar-related breach of contract case, Bank of America, FSB v.
Doumani, 495 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In that case, the court held that a Winstar
claim’s accrual date could be earlier than the December 7, 1989 effective date of the
new capital requirements of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (Aug. 9, 1989). The
Federal Circuit upheld the COFC’s finding that the thrift’s claim accrued on
October 6, 1989, the date when the Office of Thrift Supervision unambiguously
demanded accounting changes consistent with FIRREA and inconsistent with the
thrift’s goodwill contracts with the government. Doumani, 495 F.3d at 1373. Judge
Mayer dissented, stating that, in his view, Bank of America’s claim accrued on August
9, 1989, the date of the enactment of FIRREA. Id. at 1375 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
80. 490 F.3d 940 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
81. Id. at 942.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
83. Gonzales, 490 F.3d at 942.
84. Id. at 943.
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damages, concluding, “[t]here is no substantive difference between a
plaintiff paying money and the government returning it, and the
85
plaintiff never having to pay it in the first place.” On appeal, the
Federal Circuit squarely disagreed with this analysis, explaining that a
substantive difference exists between the return of money already
86
paid, and the lack of any payment from the outset. If Gonzales were
to prevail in his case, he would not receive any monetary relief,
87
including cash or credit in the form of an offset of other debt.
Rather, he would “simply be relieved of any obligation to pay the
88
government under the terms of the immigration bonds.” The court,
finding that this form of relief could not be characterized as
monetary relief for jurisdictional purposes under the Tucker Act,
vacated the district court’s transfer order and remanded the case with
89
instructions to dismiss.
D. National American Insurance Co. v. United States, 498 F.3d 1301
(Fed. Cir. 2007)
90

National American Insurance Co. v. United States raised the question
of whether a surety under the doctrine of equitable subrogation steps
into the shoes of a contractor for the purpose of satisfying the Tucker
91
Act’s jurisdictional requirements. The Federal Circuit answered this
question in the affirmative, relying on the longstanding principle that
a payment-bond surety is equitably subrogated to the rights of the
92
contractor whose debt it discharged.
Innovative PBX Services (“IPBX”) and the SBA entered into a
contract regarding the replacement of a telephone system at the
93
Department of Veterans Affairs. IPBX subcontracted part of the
94
95
work to Wiltel Communications, LLC (“Wiltel”). The Miller Act
required IPBX to execute payment bonds to protect the suppliers of
labor and material, as well as performance bonds to protect the

85. Id. at 944 (citing Brazos Elec. Power Coop. v. United States, 144 F.3d 784, 787
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
86. Id. at 945.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 945–46.
90. 498 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
92. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 498 F.3d at 1302–03.
93. Id. at 1303.
94. Id.
95. 40 U.S.C. § 3131(b) (2000).
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96

government. National American Insurance Company (“NAICO”)
97
acted as the surety.
When IPBX failed to pay Wiltel $675,000 for labor and material,
Wiltel brought a Miller Act claim against NAICO under the payment
98
bonds upon the completion of its work. NAICO settled the claim
99
and instructed the government to cease future payments to IPBX.
When the government made its final contract payment to IPBX
100
anyway,
NAICO filed suit in the COFC seeking damages of
101
$280,000. The COFC granted summary judgment for NAICO and
held first that NAICO was equitably subrogated to the rights of IPBX
after having made payments on the payment bond and satisfied all
102
outstanding claims. Furthermore, the court found that “the Tucker
Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity extended to NAICO as an
equitable subrogee of IPBX,” and therefore, the government violated
its duty as a stakeholder on the payment bond by issuing a payment
to IPBX, even after NAICO informed the government that it had a
103
right to the contract funds.
On appeal, the government argued that NAICO could only “stand
104
in the shoes of the subcontractor whom it paid.”
The Federal
Circuit rejected the government’s argument, citing longstanding
precedent recognizing that “a payment bond surety that discharges a
contractor’s obligation to pay a subcontractor is equitably subrogated
105
As
to the rights of both the contractor and the subcontractor.”
106
stated in Insurance Company of the West v. United States, “[a] surety
bond creates a three-party relationship, in which the surety becomes
liable for the principal’s debt or duty to the third party obligee (here,
107
the government).”

96. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 498 F.3d at 1303 n.1.
97. The Miller Act requires that contractors awarded a contract of more than
$100,000 with the United States furnish two bonds: “a performance bond ‘for the
protection of the Government’ and a payment bond ‘for the protection of all
persons supplying labor and material in carrying out the work.’” Id. (quoting 40
U.S.C. § 3131(b) (2000)). “The payment bond provision was designed to provide an
alternative remedy to the mechanics’ liens ordinarily available on private
construction projects,” but which cannot attach to government property. Id.
98. Id. at 1303.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1304.
105. Id.
106. 243 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
107. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 498 F.3d at 1304 (quoting Ins. Co. of the W., 243 F.3d at
1370).
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II. BID PROTESTS
A. Chapman Law Firm Co. v. Greenleaf Construction Co., 490 F.3d 934
(Fed. Cir. 2007)
108

Chapman Law Firm Co. v. Greenleaf Construction Co. is an important
decision in two respects. First, the decision reaffirmed that an
agency’s corrective action resulting from a bid protest is subject to
109
judicial review.
Second, the Federal Circuit strictly enforced the
Supreme Court’s holding in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v.
110
West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, denying
111
businesses Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) fees where an
agency voluntarily takes corrective action and there has been no
112
court-ordered change in the legal relationship of the parties.
In
Chapman, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) solicited services to manage and market single-family
housing that HUD owned, using a “cascading” procedure under
which non-small businesses were not considered unless the
113
competition from small businesses was inadequate.
Chapman was awarded the contract as a small business, but HUD
terminated the contract for convenience and issued a new
114
Chapman filed a protest at the COFC, and HUD
solicitation.
115
proposed corrective action.
The United States filed a motion to
116
dismiss the protest.
The COFC denied the government’s motion, and concluded that
the corrective action lacked a rational basis because, inter alia, it did
not include Greenleaf Construction Company, a competing offeror,
in the small business tier despite an intervening SBA determination
117
that Greenleaf was a small business.
HUD then agreed to
reevaluate proposals and include both Chapman and Greenleaf in
118
the small business tier. Nonetheless, the court did not grant HUD’s
renewed motion to dismiss because a dismissal might have precluded
108. 490 F.3d 934 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
109. Lower courts have followed Chapman’s clear directive. E.g., Centech Group,
Inc. v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 496, 506 (2007); S. Nuclear Operating Co. v. United
States, 77 Fed. Cl. 396, 436 (2007).
110. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
111. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d) (2001).
112. Chapman Law Firm, 490 F.3d at 939.
113. Id. at 936.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 937.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Chapman or Greenleaf from applying for EAJA fees, and instead
entered judgment for Chapman and Greenleaf, noting that the
efforts of Chapman and Greenleaf were instrumental in achieving the
final outcome and materially altered the legal relationship among the
119
parties.
On appeal, both Chapman and the United States argued that the
120
COFC erred in denying the initial motion to dismiss.
Chapman
claimed that the corrective action excluding Greenleaf from the
small-business tier of the competitive range was proper because SBA’s
decision that Greenleaf was a small business came after award to
121
Chapman. The government argued that the corrective action had
rendered Chapman’s and Greenleaf’s claims moot or premature,
because the first corrective action restored the parties to their pre122
protest positions.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with both these
123
arguments and upheld the COFC’s denial of the motion to dismiss.
The court reasoned that SBA’s determination that Greenleaf was a
small business applied, and furthermore, that the government had
not yet effected a final award but continued to solicit revised
124
proposals. The court went on to explain that because the corrective
action had excluded Greenleaf from the small business tier, the
COFC properly determined that the corrective action was not
125
reasonable.
However, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the COFC’s entry of
judgment in favor of Chapman and Greenleaf following the United
126
States’ renewed motion to dismiss.
The court held that “the
availability of EAJA fees [was] not an appropriate consideration for a
127
court when determining how to dispose of a case.” Because HUD’s
revisions to the corrective action plan included Greenleaf in the small
business tier, thus resolving the issue and “adequately address[ing]
the effects of the challenged action, . . . the Court of Federal Claims
had no reasonable expectation that the action would recur,” and
128
should have dismissed the case.

119. Id.
120. Id. at 938.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 940.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 939.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 940. The Circuit viewed the agency’s revised corrective action—taken
after the Court found the initial corrective action to be unreasonable—to be
“voluntary.” Id. at 940 n.1.
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B. Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308
(Fed. Cir. 2007)
129

Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States was a case of first impression
130
in the Federal Circuit. The case was the first to apply a waiver rule
to bid protest actions, setting precedent for future cases in which
bidders who fail to object to erroneous solicitations “prior to the
close of the bidding process” waive their ability to raise the same
131
objection subsequently in a COFC action.
Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. was the incumbent contractor for the
Alcatraz Island ferry operation when the National Park Service (“Park
Service”) solicited proposals for a new Alcatraz concession contract,
including land and water transportation as well as other concession
132
services. The Park Service awarded the contract to Hornblower, as
133
In 2005, Blue & Gold
the offeror with the highest overall score.
filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”),
as well as an action in the COFC, protesting the award and seeking
134
The GAO
injunctive relief from the court to prevent award.
135
dismissed its protest upon commencement of the COFC action.
The COFC entered judgment on the administrative record in favor
of the Park Service, rejecting Blue & Gold’s contention that because
Hornblower failed to include in its proposal wages and benefits for
136
employees as required by the Service Contract Act, the Park Service
137
could not have properly evaluated Hornblower’s proposal.
However, the solicitation did not require bidders to consider the
138
Service Contract Act. Rather, the Park Service had decided not to
apply the Service Contract Act to this procurement during the
139
solicitation phase. As such, the COFC determined that Blue & Gold
was, in effect, challenging the terms of the solicitation, and stated
“that Blue & Gold ‘missed its chance to protest’ . . . because [it] . . .
did not raise the challenge prior to the submission of the
140
proposals.”

129. 492 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
130. Id. at 1313.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1311.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1311–12.
135. Id. at 1312.
136. 41 U.S.C. §§ 351–358 (2000).
137. Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P., 492 F.3d at 1312.
138. Id. at 1313.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1312 (quoting Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 487,
513 (2006)).
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s conclusion
that Blue & Gold’s protest was not a challenge to the Park Service’s
evaluation process, but to its solicitation process, which did not
require bidders to consider the Service Contract Act when submitting
141
proposals. The court stated:
We also hold that a party who has the opportunity to object to the
terms of a government solicitation containing a patent error and
fails to do so prior to the close of the bidding process waives its
ability to raise the same objection subsequently in a bid protest
142
action in the Court of Federal Claims.

Additionally, the adoption of a waiver rule for bid protest actions
would further “the [statutory mandate] that ‘the courts . . . give due
regard to the interests of national defense and national security and
143
The court found
the need for expeditious resolution of the action.’”
support for its waiver rule in the GAO’s timeliness rule, which
requires that organizations filing protests based upon apparent
improprieties in a solicitation do so prior to bid opening or receipt of
144
initial proposals. The court also cited with approval several COFC
decisions, recognizing that it would be inefficient and costly to permit
challenges to a solicitation after completing the evaluation and award
145
process.
The court noted that “[t]hese reasons underlying the patent
ambiguity doctrine apply with equal force in the bid protest context,”
preventing a contractor with knowledge of a defect to wait until after
the bidding process to raise an objection and “restart the bidding
146
process . . . with increased knowledge of its competitors.”
C. Avtel Services, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
147

In Avtel Services, Inc. v. United States, Avtel Services, Inc. (“Avtel”)
appealed the COFC’s denial of its post-award bid protest challenging
its loss of an Army contract to provide maintenance and logistical
148
support for aircraft.
In a per curiam decision, the Federal Circuit
dismissed Avtel’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on Avtel’s
141. Id. at 1313.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(3) (2000)).
144. Id. at 1314 (citing 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(1) (2007)).
145. Id. (quoting Argencord Mach. & Equip., Inc. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 167,
175 n.14 (2005); N.C. Div. of Servs. for the Blind v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 147,
165 (2002); MVM, Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 126, 130 (2000); Allied Tech.
Group, Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 125, 146 (1997); Aerolease Long Beach v.
United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 342, 358 (1994)).
146. Id.
147. 501 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
148. Id. at 1260.
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149

bankruptcy status. While Avtel’s protest was pending at the COFC,
Avtel entered into an Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors under
150
Under this agreement, Avtel made a general
California Law.
assignment to another party to liquidate its assets and distribute the
151
proceeds to creditors.
The court determined this agreement
deprived the Federal Circuit of jurisdiction over the appeal because it
152
precluded the relief Avtel sought—a resolicitation or reevaluation.
Judge Newman dissented, stating that “Avtel’s insolvency did not
extinguish its existing claims upon the Assignment for the Benefit of
153
Creditors under California law.”
Judge Newman concluded that
Avtel had disputed its inability to perform in a declaration from its
154
Judge Newman suggested that relief beyond that
former CEO.
sought in the protestor’s complaint might have been available under
the Tucker Act’s provision that “the court may award any relief that
the court considers proper.”
In filing its complaints starting in 2004, Avtel asked that the
contract be awarded to it or subjected to reprocurement. Judge
Newman explained that this does not moot any relief “that the court
155
considers proper,” an issue not explored.
She concluded,
“[t]oday’s ruling of mootness has potentially broad consequences for
government contracting, for it holds that if the losing bidder is
pressed into insolvency while its protest is pending, the right to
156
protest a wrongful award disappears. That is not correct law . . . .”
III. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
A. Winter v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 503 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
157

In Winter v. Bath Iron Works Corp., the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded an ASBCA decision granting a contractor an equitable
adjustment, finding that the board had misinterpreted the scope of
an “all-risk” insurance clause in the contract and wrongfully
determined that flushing fuel-delivery piping was a “defect” in a
158
“vessel.”

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1263.
503 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1351–52.
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The Navy and Bath Iron Works (“BIW”) were parties to a fixedprice, incentive fee contract for the construction of six guided missile
159
The contract prohibited BIW from carrying insurance
destroyers.
“against any form of loss or damage to the vessels or to the materials
160
or equipment therefor [sic].”
In lieu of insurance, the contract
contained a clause assigning the government to bear the risk of loss
that would have been covered by insurance—specifically with respect
161
to “risks of loss of and damage to the vessels.”
However, the
“insurance” clause also provided that the government would not be
liable
for any costs of the Contractor for the inspection, repair,
replacement, or renewal of any defects themselves in the vessel(s)
or such materials and equipment due to (A) defective workmanship,
or defective materials or equipment performed by or furnished by
the Contractor or its subcontractors or, (B) workmanship, or
materials or equipment performed by or furnished by the
Contractor or its subcontractors which do(es) not conform to the
162
requirements of the contract. . . .

The contract required BIW to construct the fuel oil fill and transfer
163
According to the contract,
(“FOFT”) for each of the destroyers.
BIW was to flush the FOFT system with fuel after testing to clean the
system of accumulated matter, but BIW later revised its Department
Operating Instructions to permit flushing the system with fresh
164
water.
However, ignoring both the contract provision and the
operating instructions, one of BIW’s employees flushed a FOFT
system with brackish water from the Kennebec River, some of which
remained in the FOFT piping for roughly eight months until BIW
165
discovered more than seventy holes resulting from corrosion. The
159. Id. at 1348.
160. Id.
161. Id. The insurance clause provided:
The Government assumes the risks of loss of and damage to the vessels and
such materials and equipment which would have been assumed by the
underwriters if the Contractor had procured and maintained throughout the
term of this contract, on behalf of itself and the Government, insurance . . .
(i) under the forms of Marine Builders Risk (Navy Form-Syndicate)
policy . . . as set forth in the pamphlet . . . dated 23 November 1942, or
(ii) under any policy forms which the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (RD &
A), Insurance Office shall determine were customarily carried or would have
been customarily carried by the Contractor in the absence of the foregoing
requirement that the Contractor not carry or incur the expense of
insurance . . . .
Id. (citation omitted).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1349.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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Contracting Officer (“CO”) denied BIW’s request for an equitable
166
adjustment for the repairs and replacement of the FOFT piping.
On appeal, the ASBCA held that the “defect,” as used in the
workmanship exception to the insurance clause, was the “‘post167
hydrostatic test flush of . . . FOFT piping by brackish water.’”
The
board found that the corrosion was a “fortuitous or casualty loss”
under the insurance clause, and that BIW’s “investigation, repair []
and replacement of [the] corroded FOFT piping were not within the
168
defective workmanship exception.” Accordingly, the board granted
BIW an equitable adjustment for all claims save for the cost of reperforming the flush, and awarded the corporation $1.13 million in
169
damages. Later, on reconsideration, the board raised the damages
170
awarded to BIW to $1.17 million.
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the board misconstrued
the exclusion. The court held that the board erred in determining
that the test flush of FOFT piping using Kennebec River water was a
“defect in the vessel” because the flush, could not be a defect “in the
171
Rather, the “defect in the vessel” was the corroded FOFT
vessel.”
172
piping.
Since the board determined that the flush of brackish
water did not conform to the contract specification, the question was
whether the corrosion was “due to” the nonconforming flush, within
the meaning of the defective workmanship exception to the
173
insurance clause. The Federal Circuit determined the board made
insufficient findings of fact as to whether the flush caused the
corrosion and, accordingly, remanded the case to the board for
174
further proceedings.
IV. EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT/BREACH
A. Renda Marine v. United States, 509 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
Plaintiff Renda Marine (“Renda”), a marine dredging contractor,
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) entered into a
175
contract, governed by the Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”), involving
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing In re Bath Iron Works Corp., 06-01 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 33,158
(A.S.B.C.A. Dec. 22, 2005)).
168. Id. at 1350.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1351.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1352.
175. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601–613 (2000).
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the dredging of a portion of the Houston-Galveston Navigation
176
From January through October 2001, Renda submitted
Channel.
seven differing site condition claims to the CO, seeking additional
177
compensation.
The CO denied these claims and, in response,
Renda filed suit in the COFC on April 11, 2002, seeking $14.2
178
The COFC, after trial, entered judgment for the
million.
179
government on all of Renda’s claims.
While Renda’s suit was pending in the COFC, on November 26,
2002, the CO issued (and Renda received) a final decision under the
contract asserting six government claims against Renda, totaling
180
$11.9 million.
Renda had the right to appeal to ASBCA within
181
ninety days of receipt, or to file a lawsuit at the COFC within twelve
182
months.
However, Renda did not challenge this final decision in
either venue within the statutory time period, but instead sought
leave to amend its complaint in the ongoing COFC litigation
183
approximately nineteen months after receiving the final decision.
The COFC denied Renda’s motion on the ground that Renda was
184
untimely.
On June 1, 2005, between the trial and the issuing of the decision
by the COFC, Renda sought reconsideration of the denial of its
185
According to Renda, “its suit
motion to amend the complaint.
divested the CO of authority to render a final decision on the
Government’s claims, thereby rendering the CO’s final decision a
186
The COFC denied the motion, stating that Renda could
nullity.”
not challenge the decision because it failed to appeal the final
187
decision within the twelve-month period required by the CDA. On
appeal, Renda challenged the denial of one of its differing site

176. Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States (Renda III), 509 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1375.
180. Id.
181. Id. (citing 41 U.S.C. § 606 (2000)).
182. Id. (citing 41 U.S.C. § 609(a)(3) (2000)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing Sharman Co. v. United States, 2 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
overruled on other grounds by Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc)).
187. Id. (citing Renda Marine v. United States (Renda II), 71 Fed. Cl. 782, 797
(2006)). At the same time, the Court of Federal Claims entered judgment in favor of
the United States. Id.
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condition claims and the denial of motion for leave to amend the
188
complaint.
The differing site condition claim involved a portion of the
channel called the Flare Area, which was widened to allow ships to
189
pass safely. While dredging in the Flare Area, Renda encountered
“stiff clays” as opposed to the “soft clays” that Renda expected to find,
190
which allegedly increased Renda’s cost of performance. The COFC
held that Renda failed to prove that it was entitled to additional
compensation because it relied solely on two boring logs, which did
not indicate stiff clays, without considering other boring logs that did
191
locate stiff clays.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found no error in the trial court’s
192
findings that stiff clays were foreseeable in the Flare Area.
With
respect to the trial court’s denial of the motion for leave to amend
the complaint, the Federal Circuit applied the abuse-of-discretion
193
194
Renda relied on Sharman Co. v. United States
standard of review.
for the proposition that “[o]nce a claim is in litigation, the
Department of Justice gains exclusive authority to act in the pending
litigation . . . [a]nd that exclusive authority divests the contracting
195
officer of his authority to issue a final decision on the claim.”
In Sharman, a CO issued a final decision asserting claims against
Sharman for the return of monies that were a “mirror image” or
“effectively the same claim” that Sharman had brought before the
196
Claims Court. Because the government’s claims were the subject of
litigation, the Federal Circuit in Sharman held that the CO had no
197
authority to issue a final decision asserting claims against Sharman.
However, in Sharman, unlike the instant case, both the
government’s claim and the underlying CO decision were before the
198
court because the government had asserted a counterclaim.
In
contrast, Renda failed to timely appeal the CO’s final decision, and
199
the government did not file a counterclaim based on that decision.
The Federal Circuit held that “[o]nly a court, after hearing argument
from both a contractor and the government, may declare a
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 1375–76.
Id. at 1376.
Id.
Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States (Renda I), 66 Fed. Cl. 639 (2005).
Renda III, 509 F.3d at 1378.
Id. at 1379.
2 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Renda III, 509 F.3d at 1379 (citing Sharman, 2 F.3d at 1571).
Sharman, 2 F.3d at 1570, 1573.
Id. at 1572.
Id. at 1568.
Renda III, 509 F.3d at 1380.
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contracting officer’s final decision invalid—for whatever reason. A
200
contractor may not do so unilaterally.” Because the COFC applied
the clear language of the CDA requiring a contractor to appeal a
final decision within the prescribed time period, the Federal Circuit
held that the COFC did not err when it did not permit Renda to
201
amend its complaint.
B. ACE Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 499 F.3d 1357
(Fed. Cir. 2007)
202

In ACE Constructors, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the award of an equitable adjustment and the return of
203
liquidated damages to the plaintiff.
ACE Constructors, Inc.
(“ACE”) entered into a contract with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (“Corps”) to build a structure called the “Ammo Hot-Load
204
Facility” at Biggs Army Airfield at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas. The
project included construction of roadways, buildings, a storage pad, a
loading apron, a loading area for cargo planes, and an airplane
205
taxiway. The “bid solicitation materials,” comprised of engineering
specifications and architectural drawings, were incomplete and
206
defective.
ACE encountered performance difficulties, including:
forced alteration of construction procedures, significant unforeseen
costs, contract modifications, delays, and changes to the roster of
207
After successful completion of the project, ACE
subcontractors.
filed several claims for the additional costs arising from the
208
The CO
unexpected conditions and defective specifications.
209
granted some claims and denied others.
ACE filed suit under the
210
CDA, and after trial the COFC granted an equitable adjustment to
211
ACE.
1.

Profilographic testing of concrete paving
The first claim on appeal involved the use of “profilographic”
212
testing to measure the smoothness of concrete paving.
During
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
499 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1359–60.
Id. at 1360.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
41 U.S.C. § 605 (2000).
ACE, 499 F.3d at 1360.
Id. at 1360–63.
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contract performance, ACE was required by the Corps to use this
more expensive form of measuring smoothness rather than the less
213
ACE did so under protest, until
expensive “straightedge” testing.
the Corps agreed with ACE that the straightedge method was more
214
appropriate for the project.
The government challenged the
COFC’s award of additional costs related to the use of the
215
profilographic test.
First, the government argued that the COFC lacked jurisdiction
because the claim in the COFC was not identical to that submitted to
the CO. Under the CDA, the contractor must have presented the
claim to a CO, who must have issued a final decision regarding that
216
The Federal
claim in order for the COFC to have jurisdiction.
Circuit agreed with the COFC that the claims before the CO and the
COFC did not differ significantly, as ACE presented the
profilographic testing claim to the CO based on the same contract
provisions, the same requirements of the Corps, the same costs, the
217
same relief, and the same legal theory.
Second, the government argued that the contract unambiguously
218
required profilographic testing.
However, the Federal Circuit
noted that while certain portions of the contract could be read as
219
making the test obligatory, other portions treated it as optional.
The Federal Circuit found that the specification was defective; thus,
ACE was entitled to recover, and the court did not need to determine
220
whether the contract was ambiguous.
Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s finding that ACE
was reasonable in basing its bid on the less expensive straightedge
test, and that the government’s requirement to use profilographic
221
testing for a time was a compensable constructive change.
2.

Concrete paving
The second issue on appeal concerned which concrete paving
technique the contract required—fixed-form paving or slip-form
222
paving. While fixed-form paving entails pouring wet concrete into
pre-set metal or wooden forms, slip-form paving, a more expensive
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 1360–61.
Id. at 1361.
Id.
41 U.S.C. § 605 (2000).
ACE, 499 F.3d at 1361.
Id. at 1361–62.
Id. at 1361.
Id.
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1363–64.
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and complex technique, relies on temporary forms and relatively dry
223
ACE argued that even though the less expensive, fixedconcrete.
form paving was permissible under the contract and was the basis for
224
its bid, the specifications required the more expensive slip-form.
Ultimately, the COFC found that, because the Corps designed the
project for a slip-form paver, but approved the project for a fixed225
As such, the
form paver, the design specification was defective.
226
COFC awarded ACE compensation for its additional costs. Noting
that “[i]mpracticability of performance is ‘treated as a type of
constructive change to the contract[] because a commercially
impracticable contract imposes substantial unforeseen costs on the
contractor,’” the Federal Circuit upheld the COFC’s decision
227
entitling the contractor to an equitable adjustment.
3.

Differing site condition
The final claim on appeal involved the COFC’s finding that ACE
228
encountered a Type I differing site condition.
ACE believed that
the site would be a “balanced project,” in which the amount of dirt
excavated from the site would roughly equal the amount needed for
229
fill-ins and embankment requirements. However, the site required
230
The
approximately 129,000 additional cubic yards of soil.
government did not dispute that this incongruity was the result of a
defective specification. The COFC found that the conditions were
reasonably unforeseeable and awarded ACE $501,012.49 for direct
231
The
costs and additional costs due to constructive acceleration.
232
Federal Circuit affirmed this recovery.
C. ConocoPhillips v. United States, 501 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
In a consolidated appeal of two judgments from the COFC, the two
plaintiffs, ConocoPhillips and La Gloria Oil and Gas Company (“La
Gloria”) challenged the COFC’s dismissal of claims against the
United States. At issue in these cases were multiple contracts for the
223. Id.
224. Id. The parties submitted a stipulation to the COFC that the contract
permitted either form of paving. Id.
225. Id. at 1364.
226. Id.
227. Id. (citing Raytheon Co. v. White, 305 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d (1981))).
228. Id. at 1364–65.
229. Id. at 1365.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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Each
supply of jet fuel with the Defense Energy Support Center.
contract contained an economic price adjustment clause requiring
the contract price to be modified each month in accordance with a
Department of Energy publication, the Petroleum Marketing Monthly
234
After the contracts had been performed, the plaintiffs
(“PMM”).
filed suit in the COFC seeking reformation of the economic price
adjustment clauses so that the amount due to them under the
235
contracts would be increased. The plaintiffs argued that the PMM
was not an accurate measure of the changes in the market price for
jet fuel, and therefore the use of the clause “violated governing
regulations, was the result of a mutual or unilateral mistake, and
resulted in a breach of the government’s obligation to pay a fair
236
market price for jet fuel.” Finally, the plaintiffs sought reformation
of the contracts on the basis of alleged constitutional and regulatory
violations in connection with the government’s small-business set237
aside and minority preference programs. The COFC rejected all of
238
these arguments.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the use of the PMM as the
basis for price adjustments was contrary to a provision of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”), which “allowed the price of goods in
certain contracts to be adjusted ‘based on increases or decreases from
an agreed-upon level in published or otherwise established prices of
239
specific items or the contract end items.’”
Plaintiffs claimed that
the PMM was “not designed or intended to be used to set or adjust
prices, and did not reflect at least the fair market value of military
240
fuel.”
241
Previously, in Tesoro Hawaii Corp. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit noted that the FAR permitted the same price adjustment
clauses to be based on prices “established by reference to either a
catalog or market sources independent of the manufacturer or

233. ConocoPhillips v. United States, 501 F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1376–77.
237. Id. at 1377.
238. Id.
239. Id. (quoting 48 C.F.R § 16.203-1(a) (1994)).
240. Id. Further, the plaintiffs tried to assert that the PMM figures did not fall into
the FAR’s definition of established market prices; that is, the PMM prices were not
“current prices that (i) are established in the course of ordinary and usual trade
between buyers and sellers free to bargain and (ii) can be substantiated by data from
sources independent of the manufacturer or vendor.” Id. (quoting 48 C.F.R
§ 15.804-3(c)(2) (1994)).
241. 405 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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242

vendor,” and, therefore, the court held that the use of a price
243
adjustment clause tied to the PMM was authorized under the FAR.
However, in this case, plaintiffs alleged not only that the PMM did
not represent any manufacturer’s or vendor’s established price, but
also that the PMM was not designed to accurately measure the actual
and fair market price of jet fuels; thus, the PMM’s prices were not
244
based on “published or otherwise established prices.”
The COFC
rejected this argument, and the Federal Circuit agreed that, in fact,
the PMM is a market-based collection of sales figures that constitutes
an adequately precise measure of “established prices” to be
245
authorized under the FAR.
The Federal Circuit also rejected plaintiffs’ mutual or unilateral
246
mistake argument.
The plaintiffs argued that when they entered
into the contracts they believed that the PMM accurately reflected
market prices and did not appreciate how price changes reported in
the PMM could vary from those in other market information
247
However, the Federal Circuit found that the method by
sources.
which prices would be adjusted was clearly set forth in the contracts
and that the plaintiffs were obligated to investigate issues regarding
248
the PMM before entering into the contract.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the COFC that the government
249
had not breached its contracts with plaintiffs. The government had
made its payments pursuant to the price adjustment clause of the
contract and, therefore, plaintiffs had no basis for alleging that a fair
250
price had not been received. The court noted that “if the plaintiffs
had wanted the contract price to be adjusted based on a different
measure of market price, they should not have agreed to use the
251
PMM.”

242. Id. at 1347.
243. Id. at 1348.
244. ConocoPhillips, 501 F.3d at 1377 (citing 48 C.F.R § 16.203-1(a) (1994)).
245. Id. at 1378.
246. Id. at 1380.
247. Id. at 1379–80.
248. Id. at 1380 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) (1981),
which proposes that a party bears the risk of a mistake if, at the time the contract is
entered into, it is aware that it has limited knowledge with respect to facts, but treats
the limited knowledge as sufficient).
249. Id. at 1381.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1380.
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D. North Star Steel Co. v. United States, 477 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
252

North Star Steel Co. v. United States (North Star II) addressed two
issues: what constitutes a breach of an “agreement to agree” and
what is required to prove economic duress. The Federal Circuit
found that the Department of Energy’s Western Area Power
Administration (“WAPA”) did not breach a contract with North Star
for future negotiations over rates for “regulatory services” because
plaintiff did not establish that the government failed to conduct
253
negotiations in good faith.
The Federal Circuit also found that
North Star failed to prove that it entered into an amendment to the
254
contract under duress.
North Star needed large amounts of electricity for its steel
255
WAPA, which delivered
recycling mill near Kingman, Arizona.
hydroelectric power and related services in the central and western
United States, owned the only transmission lines in the Kingman area
with sufficient voltage to serve North Star’s electric power
256
North Star entered into an agreement with the
requirements.
Arizona Electric Power Cooperative Inc. (“AEPCO”), a generation
and transmission cooperative owned by the Department of
Agriculture, and Mohave Electric Cooperative (“Mohave”), an
Arizona generation and transmission cooperative eligible to purchase
257
power from WAPA, to power its recycling mills.
This action involved the Consolidated Arrangements Contract
(“CAC”), entered into on August 17, 1994, between WAPA and
258
AEPCO for the benefit of North Star.
The parties adopted a
temporary pricing methodology for assessing charges for energy
259
supplied to North Star.
The CAC also included a provision which
provided that the parties would revisit the charge for regulation
services:
Prior to the conclusion of the first year of normal operations of the
North Star Plant, the parties shall jointly establish an appropriate
cost-based methodology to review, evaluate, and periodically, if
necessary, adjust the percentage associated with the In-Kind Energy
payment. After one (1) year of normal operations, the percentage
260
may be adjusted in accordance with said methodology.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

477 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1332–33.
Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1327.
Id.
Id. at 1326 n.1.
Id. at 1328.
Id.
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For almost two years, the parties engaged in negotiations regarding
“an appropriate cost-based methodology” for the in-kind energy
261
WAPA
payment, but these negotiations were unsuccessful.
informed North Star that a failure to agree on a revised methodology
by July 1, 1998, would result in a continuance of the temporary
262
North Star replied that its proposed
pricing methodology.
methodology included charges not within the purview of the CAC
and that WAPA’s calculation of the cost of regulation services was
263
“grossly excessive.”
In June 1999, the parties met to discuss WAPA’s new payment
264
calculation proposal to add Amendment No. 3 to the CAC. North
Star advised AEPCO that none of the proposals were reasonable and
cost-based, but that “even an unreasonable lesser charge was
265
preferable to continuation of the charge at the existing level.”
As
such, on September 15, 1999 and on behalf of North Star, WAPA and
AEPCO signed Amendment No. 3, which had retroactive effect to
266
August 1, 1999.
On April 27, 2000, North Star filed a breach-of-contract claim in
267
the COFC. The COFC held that WAPA had breached the CAC by
failing to produce cost data and to establish a cost-based
268
methodology. The Federal Circuit reversed, elucidating the correct
standard for finding a contractual breach as “whether either party
failed to negotiate in good faith with respect to an appropriate cost269
based methodology.” Thus, the court made it clear that, failure on
the part of WAPA to utilize a cost-based methodology standing alone
would not amount to a breach of contract. Such a failure would

261. Id.
262. Id. at 1329.
263. Id. (citing N. Star Steel Co. (North Star I) v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 672, 685
(2005)).
264. Id.
265. Id. (quoting North Star I, 68 Fed. Cl. at 689).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1329–30. The COFC held that it had jurisdiction over North Star’s suit
under 28 U.S.C. § 1492(a)(2) because the suit involved a claim arising under section
10(a)(1) of the CDA. North Star I, 68 Fed. Cl. at 696.
268. North Star II, 477 F.3d at 1330.
269. Id. (citing Gardiner, Kamya & Assocs. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1318, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2004); City of Tacoma v. United States, 31 F.3d 1130, 1132 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Aviation Contractor Employees, Inc. v. United States, 945 F.2d 1568, 1572
(Fed. Cir. 1991)). On appeal, the Federal Circuit first held that the trial court did
not have jurisdiction under the CDA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1492(a)(2) because the
CDA does not apply to contracts for the provision of services by the government.
However, the trial court had jurisdiction to hear North Star’s breach of contract
claim under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000), which provides for
jurisdiction for claims arising out of express contracts. Id. at 1332.
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constitute a breach of contract only if WAPA did not negotiate in
270
good faith.
With respect to the duress issue, the Federal Circuit rejected the
COFC’s holding that the North Star signed the Amendment under
duress. A finding of economic duress requires that “(1) [the party
alleging duress] involuntarily accepted [another party’s] terms,
(2) [the] circumstances permitted no other alternative, and (3) such
271
circumstances were the result of [another party’s] coercive actions.”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the COFC’s articulation of the threepronged test, but found that the third prong—that North Star’s
involuntary acceptance of Amendment No. 3 was the result of
WAPA’s coercive acts—had not been met because there was no
272
wrongful action by the government.
As the Court explained:
“[C]oercion requires a showing that the Government’s action was
wrongful, i.e., (1) illegal, (2) a breach of an express provision of the
contract without a good-faith belief that the action was permissible
under the contract, or (3) a breach of the implied covenant of good
273
faith and fair dealing.” The Federal Circuit noted that there was no
evidence that WAPA acted illegally, and the court had already held
that WAPA did not breach the contract by failing to utilize a costbased methodology and that there was no evidence to support a
274
finding of bad faith. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the
judgment in favor of North Star, and remanded the case to the COFC
275
with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the United States.
The court’s decision gives significant guidance on two points. First,
the decision reiterates the entrenched common-law rule that an
agreement to agree imposes a duty on the parties to negotiate in
good faith. Second, the Federal Circuit illuminated the type of
conduct that would establish lack of good faith, indicating, for
instance, that an agency’s failure to disclose pertinent data in its
276
possession would be a lack of good faith.

270. Id. at 1333.
271. North Star I, 68 Fed. Cl. at 722–23 (citing Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc., 329
F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
272. North Star II, 477 F.3d at 1334. The government did not dispute that North
Star involuntarily accepted Amendment No. 3, but the Federal Circuit declined to
address whether the second prong of the test—circumstances permitted no other
alternatives—was met, because it found that the third prong had not been met. Id. at
1334 n.8.
273. Id. at 1334 (quoting North Star I, 68 Fed. Cl. at 721).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1334–35.
276. Professor Nash’s commentary on this case points out a distinction between
the Federal Circuit’s articulation of the requirements for demonstrating a lack of
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V. TERMINATION
A. Ryste & Ricas, Inc. v. Harvey, 477 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
277

In Ryste & Ricas, Inc. v. Harvey, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
ASBCA’s ruling that Ryste & Ricas, Inc.’s (“RRI”) termination
278
settlement proposal was untimely filed. Under 48 C.F.R. § 52.2592(e), when a contract is terminated for the convenience of the
government, the contractor may submit a termination settlement
279
proposal within one year from the effective date of termination.
The Army terminated for default RRI’s contract for the repair and
280
renovation of a building at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. RRI appealed the
default termination to the board, which, on May 29, 2002, converted
the termination for default to a termination for the convenience of
281
the government.
RRI’s previous counsel received the board’s
decision on June 8, 2002, and claimed that it submitted a termination
settlement proposal to the Army on July 23, 2003, but the Army
282
claimed that it never received it. After receiving no response, RRI
resubmitted the proposal on October 23, 2003, and after no response
to the resubmission, appealed the CO’s “deemed denial” to the
283
board.

good faith in North Star and in Am-Pro Protective Agency v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234
(Fed. Cir. 2002). He explains:
[I]t is noteworthy that none of these decisions . . . dealing with lack of good
faith in the context of agreements to agree contains any connotation that the
contractor must prove specific intent of the Government to injure the contractor as
an element of the proof of bad faith (or lack of good faith, if you prefer).
This is in contrast to the widely discussed decision in Am-Pro Protective Agency,
Inc. v. U[nited] S[tates], which has been cited as imposing this requirement in
all situations where a contractor alleges bad faith on the part of a
Government official. This would indicate that the “specific intent to injure”
requirement is only a part of the proof of Government bad faith in selected
areas (as we have been arguing repeatedly).
Ralph C. Nash, Agreements to Agree: What is a Breach?, 21 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 33, 34–
35 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
277. 477 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
278. Id. at 1338. The ASBCA decision is available at In re Ryste & Ricas, Inc., 06-1
B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 33,124 (A.S.B.C.A. Nov. 10, 2005).
279. A termination “settlement proposal” is “a proposal for effecting settlement of
a contract terminated in whole or part, submitted by a contractor or subcontractor in
the form, and supported by the data, required by this part.” 48 C.F.R. § 49.001
(2007).
280. Ryste & Ricas, 477 F.3d at 1338.
281. Id. (In re citing Ryste & Ricas, Inc., 02-2 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 31,883 (A.S.B.C.A.
May 29, 2002)).
282. Id.
283. Id.
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The board granted summary judgment in favor of the Army and
284
held that the effective date of termination was June 8, 2002, when
285
RRI’s previous counsel received the board decision. Although RRI
argued that the “effective date of termination” under 48 C.F.R.
286
§ 49.001 (now 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 ) was September 29, 2002, when the
287
period for appealing the board’s decision expired, the board
rejected the argument, stating that there was no basis for importing
EAJA and Uniform Relocation Act (“URA”) tolling requirements into
the procedure for submitting termination for convenience settlement
288
proposals.
On appeal to the Circuit, RRI argued that the board erred in
determining that the termination settlement proposal was not timely
filed because it was not an enforceable final judgment until the 120289
day appeal period had expired on September 29, 2002.
It also
argued that the date when RRI submitted its proposal to the Army
was a disputed material fact that precluded the granting of summary
290
judgment.
The Federal Circuit found no error in the board’s grant of
291
summary judgment.
It found that the clear language of 48 C.F.R.
§ 52.259-2(e) gave RRI one year from the effective date of
termination—which was expressly defined in 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 as the
date RRI received the termination notice—to file the termination
settlement proposal, and RRI failed to submit its proposal within one
292
year of the June 8, 2002 effective date. Finally, the court disagreed
that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the date

284. Id. The Federal Circuit’s decision states the date of receipt as June 8, 2003,
which presumably is a typographical error. Id. at 1339.
285. Id. at 1338 (citing In re Ryste & Ricas, Inc., 06-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 33,124
(A.S.B.C.A. Nov. 10, 2005)).
286. “Effective date of termination means the date on which the notice of
termination requires the contractor to stop performance under the contract. If the
contractor receives the termination notice after the date fixed for termination, then
the effective date of termination means the date the contractor receives the notice.”
48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2007).
287. Ryste & Ricas, 477 F.3d at 1339. 41 U.S.C. § 607(g)(1)(A) (2000) provides
that a contractor may appeal a final decision of the Board to the Federal Circuit
within 120 days after the date of receipt of a copy of the decision.
288. Ryste & Ricas, 477 F.3d at 1339 (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89
(1991) (decided under EAJA); Melka Marine, Inc. v. United States, 29 F. App’x 594
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (unpublished decision) (decided under EAJA); Houser v. United
States, 12 Cl. Ct. 454 (1987) (decided under URA)).
289. Id. at 1340.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1341.
292. Id.
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of submission of the settlement proposal because neither date was
293
within the required one-year deadline.
VI. AUTHORITY
A. Winter v. Cath-dr/Balti Joint Venture, 497 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
294

In Winter v. Cath-dr/Balti Joint Venture,
the Federal Circuit,
reversing the conclusion of the ASBCA as to six claims, held that a
Resident Officer in Charge of Contracts (“ROICC”), who was also the
Project Manager (“PM”) at the time, lacked both express and implied
authority to direct a contractor to perform changes because the
295
contract explicitly reserved that authority to the CO. However, the
Federal Circuit remanded three other claims to the ASBCA to
determine whether the CO ratified the ROICC’s actions in those
296
instances.
The Navy and Cath-dr/Balti Joint Venture (“Cath”) entered into a
fixed-price contract for external renovation of a historic dental
research facility located at the Great Lakes Navy Training Center in
297
Illinois. The contract incorporated the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (“NAVFAC”) Clause 5252.201-9300 Contracting Officer
Authority (June 1994) and NAVFAC Clause 5252.242-9300
298
The former clause
Government Representatives (June 1994).
authorizes the CO to bind the government to any “contract,
modification, change order, letter or verbal direction to the
299
The latter clause appoints the Engineer in Charge
contractor.”
(“EIC”) as the CO’s authorized representative responsible for
monitoring performance and technical management, and grants the
CO the sole authority to bind the government to a contract
300
modification.
The contract also contained the standard
Contracting Officer’s Representative (“COR”) Clause, which
permitted the CO to designate a COR to perform “specific technical
301
or administrative functions.”

293. Id. at 1342.
294. 497 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
295. Id. at 1341. The Federal Circuit, however, upheld the ASBCA’s decision on
one of its other claims because that claim was independently sustainable based on a
differing site condition, which the Navy did not appeal. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1345.
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Navy and Cath officials attended a preconstruction conference to
“develop a mutual understanding” regarding the administration of
302
the contract. The CO, although required by contract to attend the
303
conference, was not present.
At the conference, the Navy
presented its detailed guidelines for contract administration,
designated the ROICC PM to administer the contract, and directed
304
all correspondence to him.
The Navy also used a slide in its presentation that set forth the
parameters for contract modifications. The slide first indicated that
modifications could only be written; “[o]ral modifications will not be
305
used.” The slide then recognized that there could be two forms of
modifications: (1) bilateral modifications, where “the contractor and
the ROICC have agreed upon an adjustment to the contract,” and
(2) unilateral modifications, where “the ROICC can direct the
306
contractor to take some action under the contract.”
307
Cath began performance on January 25, 1999.
The Navy
reassigned the day-to-day contract administration to EIC Tim Meland,
308
In
and directed that all correspondence be sent to his attention.
response, Cath sent a request for information (“RFI”) seeking
“documentation of assignment of authority” and information
309
regarding the “level of authority” of Meland and others. The Navy
responded, among other things, that Mr. Meland “[p]repares and/or
coordinates . . . contract modifications in support to ensure a
310
satisfactory and timely completion of the projects.”
During the performance of the contract, Meland and his successors
received requests for clarification of contract requirements and
requests for decisions regarding site conditions that might require
311
deviation from the contract specifications. The ROICC PM signed
312
the response to each request.
Once Cath completed its work under the contract, it submitted to
the PM a cumulative request for a contract modification and some
313
adjustments.
Other than an acknowledgment of receipt, the PM

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. at 1342 (quoting contract specification).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1346.
Id.
Id. at 1342.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1342–43.
Id. at 1343.
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After waiting
never formally responded to this request in writing.
for a response from the ROICC office for five months, Cath
315
submitted a certified claim in December 2000.
The final decision of the CO, issued on July 27, 2001, found
316
entitlement to an equitable adjustment for twelve claims. The final
decision also recommended a negotiated settlement for the
meritorious claims and asked for a final decision to be “held in
317
abeyance subject to further discussions with the ROICC.” Although
Cath tried to engage in discussions with the Navy on the amount it
318
should receive on its claims, the Navy refused to meet with Cath.
On appeal before the ASBCA, Cath argued, and the ASBCA
agreed, that an accounting for the twelve claims was necessary
319
because the July 27 decision was a concession of Cath’s entitlement.
In response to an Order To Show Cause as to why entitlement should
not be granted on these twelve claims, the Navy argued that the
320
However, the
decision was not a determination of entitlement.
ASBCA disagreed and issued a memorandum on May 6, 2003,
321
indicating that the final decision “clearly concede[s] entitlement.”
The Navy then issued a second final decision denying all of Cath’s
claims, including the twelve that the CO previously determined had
322
merit, on the ground that no additional data had been provided.
On appeal of that final decision before the ASBCA, the Navy
argued for the first time that Cath was not entitled to compensation
because the CO did not direct the changed work. The ASBCA,
323
With
nonetheless, sustained thirteen of Cath’s thirty-seven claims.
respect to all but one of those claims appealed by the Navy, the
ASBCA determined that the ROICC PM directed changes not
324
required by the contract that resulted in additional costs. Further,
the ASBCA concluded that Cath was entitled to compensation
because the PM had “express actual authority” to resolve minor
325
The Navy’s RFI response, which indicated that the PM
problems.
was authorized to provide “‘technical and administrative direction to

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1344.
Id.
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resolve problems encountered during construction,’” made this
326
express actual authority evident.
In analyzing whether Cath was entitled to an equitable adjustment,
the Federal Circuit noted that Cath had the burden of proving that
the contract was modified by someone with actual authority, and that
327
The court explained that
apparent authority was not sufficient.
328
actual authority can be express or implied. With respect to express
authority to bind the government, the court noted that the
government gave authority to enter into and modify the contract
329
exclusively to COs. Moreover, COs had the authority to “administer
the contract and ensure the contractor’s compliance with the
330
However, the court recognized that a CO may
contract terms.”
delegate authority to certain representatives, who may act on behalf
331
of the government during contract administration.
The Federal Circuit found that a limited delegation of authority
occurred in this case. Specifically, the court cited the clause that
permitted the CO to designate a “contracting officer’s representative
332
(COR)” to perform “specific technical or administrative functions.”
Additionally, the “Government Representatives (June 1994)” clause
authorized the EIC, as a “representative of the Contracting Officer,”
to be “responsible for monitoring performance and the technical
333
management of the effort required hereunder.”
However, the Federal Circuit held that the CO’s delegation of
authority did not include the authority to make contract
modifications because federal regulations prohibited delegating
334
authority to a COR to modify the contract, and this express
335
limitation was incorporated into a clause of the contract itself.
Furthermore, the contract contained additional clauses specifically
stating that the only person with the authority to make changes to the
336
contract was the CO.
326. Id. (citing the ASBCA opinion, which quoted In re Urban Pathfinders, Inc., 79-1
B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 13,709, at 67,260 (A.S.B.C.A. 1979)).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. (citing 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.601(a), 43.102 (2007)).
330. Id. (citing 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.602-1, 1.602-2 (2007)).
331. Id. (citing JOHN CIBINIC, JR., RALPH C. NASH, JR., & JAMES F. NAGLE,
ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 39 (4th ed. 2006)).
332. Id. at 1344–45 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 252.201-7000 (2007)).
333. Id. at 1345 (quoting NAVFAC Clause 5252.242-9300 Government
Representatives (June 1994)).
334. Id. (citing 48 C.F.R. § 201.602-2 (1998); 48 C.F.R. § 252.201-7000 (2007)).
335. Id.
336. Id. (pointing to NAVFAC Clause 5252.201-9300 Contracting Officer Authority
(June 1994) and NAVFAC Clause 5252.242-9300 Government Representatives (June
1994)).
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As to implied authority, the Federal Circuit described the issue as a
337
“much closer case.” The court noted that Cath complied with the
338
Navy’s instructions for day-to-day contract administration.
However, the court determined that the Navy’s instructions
contradicted the clear language of the contract, and that the terms of
339
the contract must govern.
In the Court’s view, the ROICC PM “could not have had the implicit
authority to authorize contract modifications” because the contract
language and government regulations incorporated into the contract
“explicitly stated that only the CO had authority to modify the
340
contract.” While a government employee has the implied authority
to bind the federal government in contract when it is an integral part
341
of his duties, the Federal Circuit found that, in the face of such
contractual and regulatory language, modifying the contract could
342
not be an integral part of the ROICC PM’s duties. Accordingly, the
Court held that the PM lacked implied authority to modify the
343
contract.
In the absence of actual or implied authority to bind the
government, Cath argued that the changes directed by the CO had
been ratified and were therefore binding. As evidence of ratification,
Cath pointed to the July 27, 2001 Final Decision, which reflected that
a person with actual authority and sufficient knowledge of the
344
material facts endorsed the actions of the ROICC PM.
The Federal Circuit recognized that “[r]atification requires
knowledge of material facts involving the unauthorized act and
345
approval of the activity by one with authority.” Because of a dispute
over whether the CO had knowledge of such material facts, and the
lack of findings by the ASBCA, the Federal Circuit remanded the case
to the ASBCA to consider whether the July 27, 2001 Final Decision
constituted ratification of three of the ROICC PM’s contract
346
modifications.
337. Id. at 1346.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. (citing H. Landau & Co. v. United States, 886 F.2d 322, 324 (Fed. Cir.
1989)).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1346–47. The ASBCA had not considered ratification since it
determined that the ROICC PM had actual authority to modify the contract. Id. at
1347.
345. Id. at 1347 (citing Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. United States, 142
F.3d 1429, 1433–34 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
346. Id. at 1348.
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Judge Prost dissented in part on the ground that remand was
unnecessary and that the CO’s July 27, 2001 decision did not
347
constitute a ratification of the PM’s unauthorized change orders.
Professor Nash commented that Winter has practical ramifications
for contractors:
It seems quite clear from the facts that both parties to the contract
(including the Navy CO) believed, during contract administration,
that the ROICC/Project Manager had the authority to work out
routine specification problems as they arose. But the contract
contained all of the protective clauses that guarded the
Government against this practical result. While the contractor
under the unique facts of this case may eventually recover under
the ratification theory, the decision serves as a strong warning to
contractors that they should not work with a Government agency to
achieve effective performance of the contract by resolving routine
specification problems with the personnel at the site of the work.
Rather, as long as protective clauses are included in their contract,
they should only resolve specification problems after they have
348
received written direction from a designated CO.

VII. DAMAGES
A. Citizens Federal Bank v. United States, 474 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
In squarely confronting the issue of the proper standard of
causation for assessing damages, the Federal Circuit stated in Citizens
349
Federal Bank v. United States :
Our cases dealing with the proper standard of causation may
appear superficially somewhat inconsistent in applying the
“substantial factor” and “but for” theories. We discern a common
thread among them, however: the selection of an appropriate
causation standard depends upon the facts of the particular case
350
and lies largely within the trial court’s discretion.

The Federal Circuit explained that the method used by a trial court
351
to determine damages is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The
Citizens Federal majority affirmed the COFC’s use of the “substantial
352
factor” standard.
347. Id. at 1349 (Prost, J., dissenting).
348. Ralph C. Nash, Contracting Officer Authority: A Strict Requirement, 21 NASH &
CIBINIC REP. 153, 156 (2007).
349. 474 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
350. Id. at 1318.
351. Id. (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1461 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc)).
352. Id. at 1319–20.
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Judge Rader dissented on the grounds that only the “but for”
standard is proper, citing the recent ruling in California Federal Bank
353
354
v. United States that Myerle v. United States set forth the proper test
355
for causation.
During the federal savings and loan crisis of the 1980’s, the Federal
government created a coping strategy whereby healthy federal savings
and loan companies, known as “thrifts,” could acquire failing thrifts
and then account for the deficits they assumed using a fictional
356
The
accounting concept known as “regulatory goodwill.”
government entered into numerous agreements with these thrifts,
permitting them to count the regulatory goodwill toward federal
capital requirements and amortize it over an extended period of
357
time.
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act
of 1989 (“FIRREA”) subsequently eliminated the use of regulatory
goodwill, and also prevented the thrifts from counting subordinated
358
debt toward their regulatory capital. As a result, many thrifts failed
359
The thrifts sued in the
and were liquidated by federal regulators.
COFC, alleging that FIRREA constituted a breach of contract and
360
claiming damages under various theories. In United States v. Winstar
361
Corp., the Supreme Court established that the passage of FIRREA
constituted a breach of contract, but the Court did not address
362
damages.
Thus, the Federal Circuit has evaluated damages with
363
respect to each Winstar-related case on an individual basis.
Pursuant to an assistance agreement with the government, Citizens
Federal Bank obtained $35.9 million in regulatory goodwill for its
1986 acquisition of a financially troubled thrift, followed by another
364
After FIRREA,
$17 million for a similar acquisition in 1988.
Citizens Federal Bank dealt with the reduction in its regulatory
capital by exchanging non-cumulative preferred stock for its
353. 395 F.3d 1263, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
354. 33 Ct. Cl. 1 (1897).
355. Citizens Fed. Bank, 474 F.3d at 1322 (Rader, J., dissenting).
356. Id. at 1316 (majority opinion) (indicating that “regulatory goodwill” is the
term applied to “excess of the amount paid for the acquired thrift over that entity’s
value.”).
357. Id.
358. Id. (citing Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183).
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
362. Citizens Fed. Bank, 474 F.3d at 1316 (citing Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 910).
363. Id.
364. Id. at 1317.
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subordinated notes and reducing its assets to stay in capital
365
compliance. Following trial, the COFC ruled that the government
breached its assistance agreement with Citizens Federal, awarding the
bank total mitigation damages of $18.6 million—transaction costs of
$3,802,901 for the exchange of preferred stock for debt; $266,000 for
the difference between the dividend rate on the preferred stock and
the interest rate on the subordinated notes; and $14,615,000 as
compensation for diminished cash flow due to adverse tax
366
consequences of the exchange.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered Citizens Federal’s
367
damages claims using the “substantial factor” theory of causation.
The court observed that Winstar cases apply differing standards of
causation when determining damages, including the “but-for” theory
368
369
of causation, and the “substantial factor” test. The Citizens Federal
court found that there was no “broad rule” dictating the use of any
particular theory and affirmed the COFC’s use of the substantial
370
factor theory.
The court then addressed the government’s claim that the
mitigation damages claimed by Citizens Federal due to refinancing
costs were not attributable to the government’s breach because its
agreement with Citizens Federal did not expressly authorize the use
371
of subordinated debt as regulatory capital in the first place.
The
government also argued that the adverse tax consequences suffered
372
The
by Citizens Federal were not a foreseeable result of FIRREA.
373
Federal Circuit rejected these arguments, finding that Citizens
Federal’s post-FIRREA strategy of refinancing its subordinated debt
through preferred stock was “a commercially reasonable effort to
maintain its debt-to-equity ratio, and fair and reasonable efforts to
374
With regard to the
mitigate are all that the law requires.”
foreseeability of adverse tax consequences, the court stated that “[i]f
it was foreseeable that the breach would cause the other party to
obtain additional capital, there is no requirement that the particular
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1318.
368. Id. at 1319 (citing First Heights Bank, FSB v. United States, 422 F.3d 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2005); La Van v. United States, 382 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
369. Id. (citing Energy Capital Corp. v. United States, 302 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Bluebonnet Sav. Bank v. United States, 266 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1320.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1321 (quoting Home Sav. of Am., FSB v. United States, 399 F.3d 1341,
1351) (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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method used to raise that capital or its consequences also be
375
The Federal Circuit affirmed the award of
foreseeable.”
376
$18,683,901 in damages.
B. Hughes v. United States, 498 F.3d 1334 (Fed Cir. 2007)
In this Winstar-related breach-of-contract case, the Federal Circuit
held that a contract with the government that gave a thrift favorable
regulatory treatment shifted the risk of regulatory change onto the
private parties, thereby shielding the government from liability for
377
breach of contract from regulatory changes resulting from FIRREA.
El Paso Federal Savings and Loan Association (“Old El Paso”), an
undercapitalized thrift, entered into a merger agreement whereby
Old El Paso underwent a supervisory conversion to merge into El
378
New El Paso was a
Paso Savings Association (“New El Paso”).
wholly-owned subsidiary of the El Paso Holding Corporation
379
(“EPHC”), and Alfred Hughes, the EPHC president and majority
shareholder, entered into the merger agreement in connection with
380
the supervisory conversion.
Under the conversion, Old El Paso
would be merged into New El Paso, and EPHC would acquire Old El
Paso in exchange for fourteen real estate parcels valued at $47.3
381
million and $11.5 million in cash. The merger agreement required
the “‘amortization of goodwill arising from purchase method
accounting, for regulatory purposes, by use of the straight-line
382
method over a 25-year period.’”
EPHC included this merger agreement in its application for
approval of the merger and supervisory conversion with the Federal
383
Home Loan Bank Board (“FHLBB”).
After negotiations, the real
384
The FHLBB issued an
estate parcels were valued at $35 million.
385
approval letter for the merger and conversion on May 13, 1988, and
issued a forbearance letter to Old El Paso, granting certain
forbearances, including a goodwill accounting forbearance

375. Id.
376. Id. at 1322.
377. Hughes v. United States, 498 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed Cir. 2007), petition for cert.
filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3305 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2007) (No. 07-735).
378. Id. at 1335.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 1335–36.
384. Id. at 1336.
385. Id.
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amortizing the goodwill by New El Paso over a twenty-five year
386
period.
Two weeks later, EPHC and the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) issued a Regulatory Capital
Maintenance Dividend Agreement (“Dividend Agreement”), under
which, in return for the FSLIC’s approval of the acquisition of control
of Old El Paso, EPHC was required to “infuse sufficient additional
capital” into New El Paso so that it could maintain its regulatory
387
Included in the Dividend Agreement was a
capital requirements.
miscellaneous provision, which stated that “‘[a]ll references to
regulations of the Board or the FSLIC used in this Agreement shall
include any successor regulation thereto, it being expressly
understood that subsequent amendments to such regulations may be
made and that such amendments may increase or decrease the
388
Acquiror’s obligation under this Agreement.’”
A year later, however, the newly-passed FIRREA limited the ability
389
of thrifts like New El Paso to include goodwill in regulatory capital,
which caused New El Paso’s regulatory capital to fall out of
390
compliance with required levels.
When this happened, the Office
of Thrift Supervision placed New El Paso in a receivership and
391
subsequently liquidated the thrift.
Hughes and EPHC filed an action claiming that FIRREA’s
enactment was a breach of the contract which permitted New El Paso
392
The
to count supervisory goodwill towards its regulatory capital.
trial court found that the government was not liable to EPHC because
EPHC assumed the risk of regulatory change in the Dividend
393
That Agreement, however, did not bind Alfred
Agreement.
394
Hughes, and since he did not assume the risk of regulatory change,
395
he was awarded $46.5 million in damages for his investments.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that it was bound by prior
decisions, which, with respect to identical goodwill promises in their
forbearance letters and identical risk-shifting clauses in their
Dividend Agreements, shifted the risk of regulatory change to the
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1337 (citing United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 856–60
(1996)).
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
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396

private parties. The court then found that nothing in the Dividend
Agreement in the present case distinguished it from these prior
397
cases.
The Federal Circuit then addressed whether Hughes, despite not
having signed the Dividend Agreement containing the risk-shifting
provision, was a party to the Agreement such that the risk-shifting
398
provision precluded his recovery. The court here followed Franklin
399
Federal Savings Bank v. United States, to find that the approval letter
and the forbearance letter were not separate contracts, but rather
“regulatory approvals that could only become enforceable by . . . the
400
Dividend Agreement.”
In both Franklin and the instant case, the
individual plaintiffs were not signatories to the Dividend Agreement;
the Dividend Agreement did not incorporate any other related
contractual documents, and the identical forbearance letters were
401
not addressed to the individual shareholder. If Hughes was a party
to the overarching agreement, he too assumed the risk of regulatory
402
change, and therefore could not recover from the government.
C. Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Wynne, 497 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
This important decision revisits the evidentiary predicate necessary
for a tribunal to award damages using the jury verdict method. Due
to woefully inadequate evidence in Grumman Aerospace Corp. v.
403
Wynne, the Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA’s decision to deny
404
recovery on successful claims using the jury verdict method.
In December 1985, as part of the Avionics Modernization Program
(“AMP”), the Air Force awarded Grumman Aerospace a contract to
“design, manufacture, and furnish kits to upgrade the avionics” of
405
While executing the contract, a series of disputes
F-111 aircraft.
arose between Grumman and the Air Force, in which Grumman
asserted that it had incurred “unanticipated costs” due to insufficient
406
data from the Air Force. On March 30, 1994, Grumman submitted
396. Id. (citing Franklin Fed. Sav. Bank v. United States, 431 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Admiral Fin. Corp. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
397. Id. at 1338.
398. Id. at 1339.
399. 431 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
400. Hughes v. United States, 498 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Franklin
Fed. Sav. Bank, 431 F.3d at 1365–66).
401. Id.
402. Id. at 1341.
403. 497 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
404. Id. at 1359.
405. Id. at 1354.
406. Id. at 1355.
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a certified claim for twenty-nine items totaling $65 million in
407
On
damages, plus interest calculated on a “total cost” method.
September 30, 1994, the CO granted some damages on a few claims,
408
but denied liability under the total cost method.
Grumman appealed this decision to the board and included a
409
When the board requested
claim for jury verdict damages.
additional proof on damages and costs, Grumman retained an
accounting firm that, applying the modified total cost method,
410
Grumman eventually
calculated damages at almost $50.4 million.
411
lowered its damages request to between $22.7 and $25.8 million. In
the alternative, Grumman sought jury verdict damages for the
fourteen claims upheld by the board, but the board rejected the jury
412
The board then
verdict method, citing insufficient evidence.
awarded damages in the amount of $387,067 plus interest on six
413
claims.
The jury verdict method considers the entire record to estimate
414
The Federal Circuit articulated the requisites for
damages.
awarding damages based on a jury verdict method: “(1) that clear
proof of injury exists; (2) that there is no more reliable method for
computing damages; and (3) that the evidence is sufficient for a
court to make a fair and reasonable approximation of the
415
damages.” The court also noted that the jury verdict method may
416
only be used when “more exact” techniques are not appropriate.
The Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the board’s
finding of a lack of evidence to support a jury verdict, noting that the
board had closely considered an extensive number of documents,
hundreds of pages of cost information, and a large amount of
417
testimony before reaching its conclusion.
For example, the board
found that an internal memorandum purporting to show the number
of man-hours expended did not distinguish between work within the
scope of the contract and outside it, suggesting that the damages
407. Id. at 1356.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. (citing In re Grumman Aerospace Corp., 06-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 33,216, at
164,621 (A.S.B.C.A. Feb. 27, 2006)).
413. Id.
414. Id. at 1358 (citing Raytheon Co. v. White, 305 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
415. Id. (quoting Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872, 880 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
416. Id.
417. Id. at 1359.
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418

Moreover,
suffered resulted from Grumman’s own mistakes.
Grumman mistakenly relied on the cost figures from the CO’s review
of Grumman’s request for an equitable adjustment and prematurely
419
destroyed project records preventing substantiation of its claim.
Finally, the board found that Grumman’s damage figures
wrongfully relied on a consultant’s report, which was not based on
420
actual costs.
Furthermore, that same report did not attempt to
evaluate independently the reasonableness of Grumman’s costs, but
instead relied on the Source Selection Advisory Council analysis
421
report that only set forth “acceptable parameters.” Considering the
record, the Circuit found that the trial court had not erred in finding
that the evidence Grumman presented “did not support a fair and
422
reasonable approximation of damages.”
Judge Newman dissented on the grounds that the result was grossly
unfair to the contractor, stating that the board had failed to fully
consider the three prerequisite considerations to applying the jury
423
verdict method.
In light of this, Judge Newman found that the
board had essentially failed to make “its best estimate of a fair and
just award based on the best available information,” noting that “[i]t
is neither fair nor just to deny compensation simply because it is hard
424
To support a jury verdict, a contractor must present
to measure.”
real evidence based on actual information demonstrating the amount
425
of work completed for which the government was responsible.
D. International Data Products Corp. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1317
(Fed. Cir. 2007)
In this case, the Federal Circuit addressed a contractor’s posttermination warranty and upgrade obligations and the “total contract
price” of an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (“ID/IQ”)
contract in the context of applying the termination for convenience
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 1360 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing the three prerequisite factors for
the application of the jury verdict method set forth in Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United
States, 930 F.2d 872, 880 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
424. Id. The Federal Circuit’s decision in Grumman has been recognized as
instructive on the standard for evidence required for jury verdict awards in
government contract litigation. For an analysis of the illustrative value of Grumman,
see generally Ralph C. Nash, Postcript V: The “Jury Verdict” Approach, 21 NASH & CIBINIC
REP. ¶ 70 (2007) (highlighting the importance of presenting real evidence, or in the
alternative, well-documented estimates of work performed).
425. Nash, supra note 424, at ¶ 70 (suggesting a review of engineering notebooks
or employee interviews as means of proving the actual work completed).
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426

International Data Products (“IDP”) was
clause’s cap on recovery.
awarded an SBA Section 8(a) contract to supply computers to the Air
427
Force. The contract was a one-year fixed price ID/IQ contract with
four one-year options and had a minimum purchase requirement of
$100,000, an estimated quantity of $100 million, and a maximum
428
In 1998, IDP lost its section 8(a) status
quantity of $729 million.
when it was purchased by Dunn Computer Corporation (“Dunn”), a
429
large business. As required by section 637(a)(21)(A) of the Small
Business Act, the Air Force, after purchasing $35 million in
equipment from IDP, terminated the IDP’s contract because IDP no
430
longer qualified as a small business.
Following termination of the contract, the Air Force insisted that
431
IDP provide warranty and upgrade services.
The warranty and
upgrade clause required the contractor to “‘provide users with a
minimum 5 year . . . full parts and labor warranty for all offered
products (excluding software)’” and a “‘three year on site, 24 hour fix
or replace on hardware warranty and a two year upgrade warranty on
432
Because the continuing warranty costs threatened its
software.’”
433
existence, IDP ceased all warranty and upgrade services.
The COFC held that the termination for convenience terminated
IDP’s obligation to continue providing warranty and upgrade
434
services.
The Federal Circuit reversed and held that the
termination for convenience did not extinguish IDP’s obligations to
435
provide warranty and upgrade services.
In addition, IDP sought the warranty and upgrade costs it
436
incurred. IDP’s theories of recovery of termination costs included
(1) expectation damages, (2) warranty services under an express
contract, (3) warranty services under an implied-in-fact contract,
(4) warranty work under a theory of constructive change, equitable
437
adjustment or cardinal change, and (5) quantum meruit.
426. Int’l Data Prods. Corp. v. United States (IDP III), 492 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
427. Id. at 1320.
428. Id. at 1320–21.
429. Id. at 1321.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 1322 (quoting the warranty clause of IDP’s contract).
433. Id. at 1321.
434. Id. at 1320 (citing Int’l Data Prods. Corp. v. United States (IDP II), 70 Fed. Cl.
387, 394 (2006); Int’l Data Prods. Corp. v. United States (IDP I), 64 Fed. Cl. 642,
650–51 (2005)).
435. Id. at 1323.
436. Id.
437. Id.
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The Federal Circuit rejected all these theories. IDP’s expectancy
damage theory was predicated on a termination clause in the
contract, which stated that
The Government shall pay . . . reasonable, allowable, and allocable
costs, determined in accordance with FAR Part 31, incurred by the
contractor, prior to the date of termination for completed work
that has not previously been paid for; for work in process and
materials directly related to the terminated portion of the
438
contract . . . .

However, the same clause provided that the “termination amounts
payable and any amounts for items delivered under the contract”
439
could not exceed “total contract price.” Because the Court deemed
the total contract price to be the $35 million IDP had been paid, IDP
had no further rights under the termination for convenience
440
clause.
IDP argued that “total estimated quantities” reflected the “needs”
of the government and converted the contract from an ID/IQ
contract into a requirements contract, and that it was “led to believe
it would receive a minimum of $100 million in orders” and thus was
441
On appeal, the
entitled to expectancy damages in that amount.
Federal Circuit rejected IDP’s reading of the amended contract,
stating that IDP “never could have expected to automatically receive
442
all of those orders [for $100 million worth of equipment].”
The Federal Circuit rejected IDP’s other damage theories as well.
First, the court dismissed IDP’s contention that it was entitled to
termination costs under an express contract because the Air Force
continued to demand performance, holding that the contract
443
terminated upon notice to IDP.
There was no implied-in-fact
contract to provide warranty services because IDP itself disputed the
444
continued existence of the contract and an obligation to perform.
Theories of recovery based on constructive change, equitable
adjustment, or cardinal change were rejected because the Air Force
445
did not demand work above and beyond the scope of the contract.
Finally, the court rejected recovery in quantum meruit on the basis that
446
the COFC lacks jurisdiction over implied-in-law contracts.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.

Id.
Id. at 1324.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1325.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1325–26 (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000)).
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VIII. DEFENSES
A. Carabetta Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2007)
447

Carabetta Enterprises, Inc. v. United States contains an important
analysis of the interrelationship between the sovereign acts doctrine
448
and the impossibility defense. The case has significant implications
for the government’s role as a contractor in the commercial
marketplace and its ability to rely on its sovereign status to excuse it
from contractual liability.
The plaintiffs in this case, known collectively as “Carabetta,” were
owners of low-income housing properties insured by the federal
449
government under the National Housing Act (“NHA”).
In 1987,
Congress passed the Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation
Act (“ELIHPA”), authorizing the Department of Housing & Urban
Development (“HUD”) to guarantee equity loans on properties
under NHA Section 241(f), so long as the owners complied with
450
applicable HUD regulations.
In 1994, Carabetta entered into an agreement with HUD (the
“Repayment Agreement”), under which HUD agreed to insure loans
on eight Carabetta properties, the proceeds from which Carabetta
451
Carabetta
agreed to invest in achieving regulatory compliance.
452
The Repayment
achieved regulatory compliance in 1995.
Agreement provided that once Carabetta achieved regulatory
compliance, HUD would insure twenty-five specified Carabetta
453
properties plus one additional property.
In 1997, before HUD processed Carabetta’s loans, Congress passed
the Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban
Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act
(“Appropriations Act”), which prohibited section 241(f) equity

447. 482 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
448. Id.
449. Id. at 1362 (citing National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246
(1934), amended by Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 101, 75 Stat. 149, 150–51 (1961); Pub. L. No.
90-448, § 201, 82 Stat. 476, 498–501 (1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715 (2000))).
450. Id. at 1363 (citing Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-242, tit. II, 101 Stat. 1877 (1988) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715
(2000))).
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. (indicating that the insurance of a twenty-seventh property was designated
as “subject to appeal”).
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454

loans. Due to the passage of the Appropriations Act, HUD was no
longer able to issue the Section 241(f) equity loans it had promised
455
Instead, HUD was
Carabetta in the 1994 Repayment Agreement.
authorized to issue Carabetta capital loans directly to low-income
properties, with discretionary authority to distribute $75 million
456
Accordingly, HUD issued $25 million in
among the properties.
direct loans to seven Carabetta properties and used the remaining
457
$50 million to fund other properties.
Carabetta subsequently
brought suit in the COFC alleging that HUD’s failure to use the
additional $50 million to fund the rest of its properties as specified in
458
the Repayment Agreement constituted a breach of contract.
The government raised the defenses of impossibility and the
“sovereign acts doctrine,” arguing that the Appropriations Act
constituted a sovereign act which rendered HUD’s performance of
459
the Repayment Agreement impossible. The COFC held that while
the Appropriations Act was a sovereign act, it did not render HUD’s
performance impossible because HUD retained discretionary
authority to substitute capital loans for the section 241(f) equity loans
460
it had promised Carabetta.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered HUD’s liability in light
461
Under the
of the impossibility and sovereign acts doctrines.
sovereign acts doctrine, “‘the United States when sued as a contractor
cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the performance of [a]
particular contract resulting from its public and general acts as a
462
sovereign.’”
However, the court held that “even if the sovereign
acts doctrine applies, ‘it does not follow that discharge will always be
available, for the common-law doctrine of impossibility imposes
additional requirements before a party may avoid liability for
463
breach.’”
The court explained that pursuant to the doctrine of partial
impossibility or partial impracticability, an obligor retains his
contractual duties when he can render a reasonable substitute
performance for something that has become impossible to perform
454. Id. (citing the Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban
Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
105-276, 112 Stat. 2461 (1998)).
455. Id.
456. Id. at 1363–64.
457. Id. at 1364.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 1365.
462. Id. (quoting United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996)).
463. Id. (quoting Winstar, 518 U.S. at 904).
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464

In the instant case, the Federal Circuit
as originally agreed upon.
declared that while the Appropriations Act “made it impossible for
HUD to insure any of the section 241(f) loans for Carabetta’s . . .
properties . . . [it] provided HUD with the authority and capacity to
render reasonable substitute performance” by issuing $75 million in
465
capital loans.
By accepting the initial $25 million in capital loans for seven of its
properties following the passage of the Appropriations Act, Carabetta
indicated that it would accept the capital loans as a substitute for the
466
section 241(f) equity loans. As such, HUD should have proceeded
to complete its substitute performance by using the remaining $50
467
Because HUD
million to fund the rest of Carabetta’s properties.
“[did] not suggest that it lacked the capacity or authority to provide
capital loans for the . . . properties in dispute . . . [nor did it show]
that providing capital loans was unreasonable as a form of substitute
performance,” the Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s ruling on
468
HUD’s liability.
B. City Line Joint Venture v. United States, 503 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
469

In City Line Joint Venture v. United States, the Federal Circuit held
that the “sovereign acts” doctrine did not discharge the government
from contractual liability when Congress enacted legislation that
intentionally abrogated HUD’s contractual obligation to permit the
plaintiff-property owner to prepay a forty-year HUD-insured
470
mortgage.
This case is one of many involving statutes related to low-income
multi-family housing built in the 1960s and 1970s: the Emergency
471
Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 and the Low Income
Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990
472
(“LIHPRHA”). The statute at issue here, LIHPRHA, was designed
to preserve such low-income housing by disallowing prepayment of
464. Id.
465. Id. at 1365–66.
466. Id. at 1366.
467. Id.
468. Id. In Carabetta, the Federal Circuit also addressed a damages claim, and
affirmed the COFC’s denial of three components of damages: (1) a “tax gross-up”
on the proceeds of capital loans that should have been issued; (2) additional
damages attributable to the rehabilitation loans for the remaining properties that did
not receive capital loans; and (3) damages attributable to an additional property. Id.
at 1367–70.
469. 503 F.3d 1319 (Fed Cir. 2007).
470. Id. at 1323.
471. Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 202, 100 Stat. 1877 (1988).
472. Pub. L. No. 101-625, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 4249 (1990).
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HUD-insured mortgages without securing HUD’s approval and
473
meeting other conditions.
City Line Joint Venture (“City Line”) was a developer of a lowincome multi-family rental housing project in Maryland. Under
§ 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act, City Line received a HUDinsured low-interest mortgage loan from a private lender to construct
474
a housing project.
A provision of the secured note covering the
loan prohibited prepayment of the mortgage (without prior approval
from HUD) prior to twenty years from the date of the note’s final
475
endorsement by the Federal Housing Commissioner. City Line also
signed a Regulatory Agreement with HUD in return for the loan,
under which City Line agreed to certain housing project restrictions
on tenant income, rental rates, and the rate of return to the
476
The agreement provided that City Line was bound “‘so
investor.
long as the contract of mortgage insurance continues in effect, and
during such further period of time as the Commissioner shall be the
owner, holder, or reinsurer of the mortgage,’ or obligated to insure a
477
Thus, a prepayment of the mortgage
mortgage on the property.”
478
would constitute an exit from the housing project restrictions.
The note, and a supplemental note that was signed after the
479
construction of the housing project, were endorsed by the Federal
480
Housing Commissioner in 1971.
Simultaneously, the lender sold
the mortgage to the Government National Mortgage Association
481
482
City Line defaulted on the loan soon thereafter.
(“GNMA”).
GNMA assigned its mortgage rights to the insurer HUD, who then
483
became the lender.
HUD and City Line entered into workout
agreements and had outside capital infused into the projects, which
484
ultimately eliminated all mortgage arrears.
As stated above, LIHPRHA disallowed prepayments of the kind of
HUD-insured mortgage loan into which City Line entered. Later, the
485
Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 restored

473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.

City Line, 503 F.3d at 1322.
Id. at 1321.
Id. After twenty years, HUD approval was not needed. Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting the Regulatory Agreement).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 104-20, 110 Stat. 834 (1996).
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On
these prepayment rights to City Line as of April 29, 1996.
August 13, 1997, City Line prepaid the mortgage on its housing
487
project, thereby exiting the HUD program.
City Line filed suit in the COFC in November 1996 arguing that
the enactment of LIHPRHA and HUD’s enforcement of the Act
unlawfully deprived it of its contractual right to prepay its mortgage
488
Granting summary
after twenty years and exit the program.
judgment for the government, the COFC held that the enactment of
LIHPRHA was a “public and general act” and applied the sovereign
489
acts doctrine as a defense to City Line’s breach-of-contract claim.
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded for further
490
Since HUD was the assignee of the
proceedings on the claim.
mortgage, the note, and the supplemental note as of 1977, the
government did not dispute the fact that it was in privity of contract
with City Line both at the time LIHPRHA was enacted in 1990 and on
August 31, 1990 when City Line was entitled under the contract to
491
exercise its prepayment right.
The Federal Circuit noted that it had already considered the
application of the sovereign acts doctrine in connection with the
enactment of both ELIHPA and LIHPRHA in the context of a takings
492
claim in Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienaga VIII). Cienega VIII
also involved owners of low-income housing whose prepayment rights
493
were taken away by ELIHPA and LIHPRHA.
The City Line court
characterized Cienega VIII as holding that the enactment of those
statutes “directly and intentionally abrogated the mortgage
494
prepayment clauses.”
More specifically, Cienega VIII held that the
owners whose prepayment rights were taken away by ELIHPA and
LIHPRHA were similarly situated to the plaintiffs in United States v.
495
Winstar Corp., in which the Court held that “the abrogation by
legislation of clear, unqualified contract rights requires a remedy,

486. City Line, 503 F.3d at 1319. The statute prevented City Line from raising
rents for at least an additional two months (restricted until at least June 26, 1996),
until after it prepaid. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id. City Line also filed a Fifth Amendment claim in the alternative seeking
compensation for what it argued was a regulatory taking. Id.
489. Id. The trial court indicated that it would not reach the regulatory taking
claim while the contract claim remained outstanding. Id. at 1323.
490. Id. at 1323.
491. Id. at 1322.
492. 331 F.3d 1319, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
493. Id. at 1325.
494. City Line, 503 F.3d at 1323 (citing Cienega VIII, 331 F.3d at 1334).
495. 518 U.S. 839, 896 (1996).

2008]

2007 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS

1127

even in a highly regulated industry (banking), because the contracts
496
embodied the commitments of the contracting parties.”
Applying Cienega VIII, the City Line court stated, “While this analysis
of ELIHPA and LIHPRHA occurred in the takings context, our
reasoning and understanding of their effects have equal relevance to
the application of the sovereign acts doctrine as applied to a breach497
of-contract claim with respect to the same legislative enactments.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit determined that the government
could not use the impossibility defense to avoid liability under City
498
Line’s breach-of-contract claim.
C. Long Island Savings Bank, FSB v. United States, 503 F.3d 1234
(Fed. Cir. 2007)
499

In Long Island Savings Bank, FSB v. United States (Long Island III),
the Federal Circuit held that a Winstar-related contract between a
thrift and the government was tainted by fraud from its inception and
500
The Circuit determined that the bank’s failure to
void ab initio.
disclose that its chief executive officer (“CEO”) had breached his
fiduciary duties to the bank—by receiving compensation from his law
firm for directing its mortgage work to that firm—constituted fraud
501
This holding
and was a prior material breach of the contract.
reversed the COFC’s entry of summary judgment denying the
government’s counterclaim and affirmative defenses and award of
$435,755,000 in damages to the Long Island Savings Bank, FSB
496. Cienega VIII, 331 F.3d at 1334 (citing Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–97). Cienega
VIII further explained why the enactment of ELIHPA and LIHPRHA could not
shield the government from liability:
The purpose of contracts is precisely to fix obligations and entitlements so
that they will not be affected by subsequent background changes. . . . To
hold otherwise would mean that Congress could have changed the mortgage
contracts in any way to affect any of the rights established by the contracts—
including changing the contracts to extend their term from forty to, for
example, eighty years—and the Owners would be without a remedy. Again,
this is not and cannot be the law.
Id.
497. City Line, 503 F.3d at 1323. City Line appears to presuppose that the
“sovereign acts” doctrine is a subset of the standard contract law defense of
“impossibility.”
498. Id.
499. 503 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2007), petition for reh’g denied, Long Island Sav. Bank,
FSB v. United States, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 30345 (Fed. Cir., Dec. 28, 2007) (en
banc).
500. Id. at 1237.
501. Id. A previous panel decision in this case held that the thrift’s claims against
the government were forfeited under 28 U.S.C. § 2514 (2000). Long Island Sav.
Bank, FSB v. United States (Long Island II), 476 F.3d 917, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit vacated that decision and returned the case to
the original panel for revision. Long Island III, 503 F.3d at 1237.
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(“LISB”) and the Long Island Savings Bank of Centereach
502
(“Centereach”) after trial. This case provides a model as to how the
Federal Circuit analyzes an affirmative defense of fraud in the
inception of the contract and its relationship to a prior material
breach-of-contract defense. Accordingly, an extended summary is
provided.
1.

The contract
In April 1982, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (“FSLIC”) merged two failing thrifts into Suffolk County
503
Federal Savings and Loan Association (“Suffolk”).
In October
1982, the FSLIC solicited acquirers of Suffolk because Suffolk was
504
continuing to decline. Of the six bids received, LISB’s was the most
favorable “because it proposed the least amount of financial
assistance from the FSLIC” and because LISB had a “proven record of
505
The parties executed a final
sound financial management.”
Assistance Agreement on August 17, 1983, under which Suffolk
converted from a mutual savings and loan association to a federal
506
LISB
stock savings bank and changed its name to Centereach.
acquired Centereach as a wholly owned subsidiary through a one
hundred percent common stock purchase in the amount of
507
$100,000. In return, the government made a cash contribution of
$75 million to Centereach within three business days of acquisition
and a total infusion of $122 million based on the Assistance
508
Like other Winstar cases, the
Agreement and other agreements.
government agreed that LISB and Centereach could, under
accounting rules that were formerly in effect, account for
approximately $625.4 million of goodwill to be amortized over forty
509
years using the straight-line method.

502. Long Island III, 503 F.3d at 1237. On Feb. 1, 2007, the Federal Circuit
reversed the trial court’s judgment and held that the banks’ claims against the
government were forfeited under 28 U.S.C. § 2514. Long Island II, 476 F.3d at 933.
However, after a petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, and a response
from the government were filed, the court, acting en banc, returned the case to the
original panel for revision. Long Island III, 503 F.3d at 1237. The panel withdrew
and vacated its February 1, 2007 opinion and replaced it with the present opinion.
Id.
503. Long Island III, 503 F.3d at 1237.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id. at 1237–38.
509. Id. at 1238 (citing United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 853–56
(1996)).
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The Assistance Agreement conditioned the government’s
acceptance of its contractual obligations by requiring a certificate
from the chairman of the board of LISB, James Conway, that certain
representations and warranties in the Assistance Agreement were true
and substantially correct and that no event had occurred that would
510
Among these representations and warranties
constitute a breach.
were that “LISB is not in violation of any applicable statutes [and]
regulations” and that “all information furnished by LISB in
connection with this Agreement or the Master Agreement do not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to be stated in order to make the statements
511
Conway signed this
contained therein not misleading.”
512
certification.
2.

LISB CEO’s law firm compensation
At the same time as serving as chairman of the board and CEO of
LISB and Centereach, Conway was also compensated by the law firm
513
Conway & Ryan.
Conway & Ryan was LISB and Centereach’s
“primary outside counsel” and performed their mortgage closing
514
services and occasional foreclosure proceedings.
The mortgage
515
matters were a “substantial portion” of the law firm’s revenues. As
the COFC stated, “[f]rom 1982 to 1991, Conway caused LISB to
utilize the firm as LISB’s sole mortgage closing counsel, and he
ensured that the firm had the exclusive right to represent LISB in
connection with all mortgage closings without action from the
516
Board.”
While Conway ceased practicing law after becoming CEO
of LISB, he continued to receive compensation from the law firm,
including income from the bank’s mortgage closings, receiving at
least $3.5 million between 1980 and 1989, for a total of $10.9 million
517
collectively with his daughter and daughter-in-law. Neither Conway
nor LISB disclosed to the regulators the compensation he and his
family received, but instead, LISB submitted misleading answers
regarding Conway’s remuneration from his law firm in its application

510. Id.
511. Id. (emphasis omitted).
512. Id.
513. Id. at 1239.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id. (quoting Long Island Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States (Long Island I), 54
Fed. Cl. 607, 610 (2002)).
517. Id.
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to the FHLBB for conversion and in subsequent FHLBB thrift
518
examinations.
In its summary judgment briefs, the government submitted an
affidavit from its supervisory agent responsible for recommending
519
approval of LISB’s acquisition of Centereach. The affidavit stated
that if Conway had revealed his kickback scheme or that he was
violating anti-kickback laws, the regulator would have recommended
discontinuance of negotiations with LISB for its acquisition of
Suffolk, and that the FSLIC and FHLBB would not have provided
regulatory assistance or financial assistance to a thrift involved in “the
520
type of serious impropriety at issue in this case.”
3.

FIRREA and the investigation of Conway’s kickback scheme
On August 9, 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions
521
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”).
FIRREA restricted Centereach’s ability to count supervisory goodwill
522
and capital credit towards its regulatory capital requirements.
FIRREA caused Centereach’s capital ratio to decline from plus eight
523
The management of LISB and
percent to minus eleven percent.
Centereach restructured the thrift by shrinking it, including selling
branches, securities, loans, paying down borrowing, merging LISB
524
and Centereach, and writing off goodwill.
In February 1990, Conway hired an outside law firm to advise the
525
In
thrifts regarding a potential lawsuit against the government.
preparation for litigation and regulatory examinations, the outside
law firm conducted a “due diligence” inquiry and discovered
526
Conway’s compensation scheme.
The outside law firm advised
527
Conway
Conway to retain his own counsel in August 1990.
528
subsequently resigned from LISB and Centereach in June 1992. In
September 1992, LISB and Centereach informed the Office of Thrift
Supervision (“OTS”) of the facts concerning Conway’s relationship
529
with his law firm.

518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.

Id. at 1240.
Id.
Id. at 1240–41.
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 83 (1989).
Long Island III, 503 F.3d at 1241.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1242.
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In February 1993, OTS investigated Conway’s law-firm
compensation and found that Conway “engaged in violations of
federal conflict-of-interest and disclosure regulations, participated in
conflicts of interest constituting an unsafe or unsound practice within
the meaning of 12 C.F.R. § 571.7, and breached his fiduciary duty
530
In February 1994, Conway entered
owed to Long Island Savings.”
into a consent order with OTS in which Conway agreed to be banned
from the thrift and banking industry and to pay $1.3 million in
531
restitution to LISB.
In February 1998, Conway pled guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 215, a criminal statute which governs the receipt of commissions or
gifts for procuring loans by an “officer, director, employee, agent, or
532
attorney of a financial institution.” In his plea, he agreed that in his
capacity as CEO of LISB, he used his influence to retain his law firm
for mortgage closings while receiving compensation from the same
533
Subsequently, Conway was disbarred for professional
firm.
534
misconduct related to this kickback arrangement.
4.

Court of Federal Claims proceeding
In August 1992, LISB and Centereach filed suit in the COFC
alleging that the government breached its contractual obligation by
535
enacting FIRREA. In February 2001, the government answered the
complaint, and asserted several affirmative defenses and
counterclaims, including forfeiture of plaintiffs’ claims “‘because the
thrifts committed fraud in the performance of the alleged
536
contract.’” On December 9, 2002, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the government’s affirmative
defenses and counterclaims: “(1) plaintiffs’ claims are forfeited
under a special plea in fraud pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2514;
(2) common law fraud renders the contract unenforceable; (3) the
contract should be rescinded and $122 million repaid to the
government; and (4) plaintiff’s prior material breach precludes
537
damages.”
The COFC held that “Conway and his firm’s status as affiliated
persons did not cause LISB to be in violation of the Assistance
530. Id. (citation omitted).
531. Id.
532. Id. at 1242 & n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 215 (2000)).
533. Id. at 1242.
534. Id. (citing In re Conway, 712 N.Y.S.2d 610, 611 (N.Y. 2000)).
535. Id. at 1241–42.
536. Id. at 1242–43 (internal citation omitted).
537. Id. at 1243 (quoting Long Island Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States (Long Island
I), 54 Fed. Cl. 607, 609 (2002)).
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538

The court also held that it could not “conclude that
Agreement.”
539
LISB, as a corporate entity, acted fraudulently.” Further, the court
540
After trial, the court
did not impute Conway’s conduct to LISB.
held the government liable for the breach and awarded $435,755,000
541
in damages to LISB and Centereach.
The government appealed
542
the damages award and the denial of its affirmative defenses.
5.

Federal common law fraud
The government argued that the plaintiffs committed fraud in the
inducement and fraud in the performance of the contract, which
543
rendered the Assistance Agreement unenforceable.
Although the
parties’ briefs framed the issue in terms of the government’s special
plea in fraud, the Federal Circuit determined that the issue of federal
common law fraud was properly before the court, citing the Supreme
Court’s statement in Winstar that “[w]hen the United States enters
into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed
generally by the law applicable to contracts between private
544
Federal common law governed the action under the
individuals.”
545
Assistance Agreement.
The Federal Circuit cited the Restatement of Contracts for the
proposition that a misrepresentation may prevent the formation of
the contract, i.e., “void” a contract, or may make a contract
546
The court then quoted its own precedent that “the
“voidable.”
general rule is that a government contract tainted by fraud or
547
Specifically, prior Federal Circuit
wrongdoing is void ab initio.”
precedent barred recovery in the case of a government contractor’s
548
false certification.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that to
538. Id. (quoting Long Island I, 54 Fed. Cl. at 612–14) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
539. Id. (quoting Long Island I, 54 Fed. Cl. at 614–18) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
540. Id. (citing Long Island I, 54 Fed. Cl. at 618–19).
541. Id. (citing Long Island Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States (Long Island II), 67
Fed. Cl. 616, 618 (2005)).
542. Id. (citing Long Island I, 67 Fed. Cl. at 618).
543. Id. at 1244.
544. Id. at 1245 (quoting United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895
(1996)).
545. Id. (quoting pertinent portion of section 16 of the Assistance Agreement
which states that “[t]his Agreement and the rights and obligations under it shall be
governed by the law of the State of New York to the extent that Federal law does not
control”).
546. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 163–164 cmt. a (1981)).
547. Id. (quoting Godley v. United States, 5 F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
548. Id. at 1246 (citing J.E.T.S., Inc. v. United States, 838 F.2d 1196, 1197 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)). In United States v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372 (D.C. Cir.
2000), the D.C. Circuit disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that

2008]

2007 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS

1133

prove that a contract is tainted from its inception by fraud and thus
void ab initio, “the government must prove that the contractor
(a) obtained the contract by (b) knowingly (c) making a false
549
statement.”
The Federal Circuit found that Conway, as CEO of LISB, submitted
a false certification and that such statement should be imputed to
550
LISB. Conway signed a certification stating that the representations
and warranties of LISB set forth in the Assistance Agreement were
true and substantially correct as of the purchase date and that no
551
event occurred which would constitute a breach. LISB represented
and warranted in the Assistance Agreement that it was “not in
552
The
violation of any applicable statutes, regulations, or orders.”
government argued that the Assistance Agreement required LISB to
comply with 12 C.F.R. § 563.17(a) (1984), requiring the thrifts to
“maintain safe and sound management,” and that 12 C.F.R. § 563.39
(1984) required thrift officers to abstain from breaching fiduciary
553
duties involving personal profit. The Federal Circuit noted that the
COFC found that Conway and his firm’s impropriety under banking
laws was clear based on the evidence, and that Conway admitted that
he committed a crime by accepting $3,194,103.87 in compensation
from his law firm intending to be influenced and rewarded for
554
steering mortgage closings to the law firm. As a result, the Federal
Circuit found that Conway both breached his fiduciary duties to LISB
555
and Centereach and personally profited from the breach.
However, unlike the trial court, the Federal Circuit held that LISB
was being operated in an unsafe and unsound manner—contrary to
its representation and warranty in the Assistance Agreement—
556
because Conway breached his fiduciary duties. The Federal Circuit
upheld the trial court’s determination that Conway knew his
557
representations and warranties in the certificate were false.

government contracts tainted by fraud or wrongdoing are “void ab initio,” as reflected
in J.E.T.S. and Godley, stating that these latter opinions “vastly expand the normally
minute group of contracts treated as void,”—“void” being a designation that the D.C.
Circuit regards as limited to a “handful” of contracts “that are seen as being in
fundamental violation of policy.” Id. at 1376–77.
549. Long Island III, 503 F.3d at 1246.
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Id.
553. Id. at 1246–47.
554. Id. at 1247.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id. at 1248.
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The Federal Circuit then turned to the issue of whether Conway’s
558
knowledge was properly imputable to the thrift. Since there was no
dispute that Conway was an agent of the bank and had knowledge of
his kickback scheme, the appellate court stated that the general rule
559
favoring imputation applied. The Federal Circuit reversed the trial
court’s finding of no imputation, reasoning that the adverse interest
exception did not apply because Conway had not “entirely abandoned
LISB’s interest for his own,” since the LISB benefited from the legal
services provided by Conway’s firm and the false certification enabled
560
LISB to acquire Centereach on favorable terms.
Finally, the Federal Circuit analyzed whether there was a causal link
561
The court found that the
between the fraud and the contract.
government justifiably relied on Conway’s misrepresentation because
it contracted for full disclosure of any conflicts of interest in order to
assure the safe and sound management of the thrift, and inferred—
based upon an affidavit—that plaintiffs would not have received the
562
contract had the regulators known of the scheme. Specifically, the
court credited the affidavit of a government supervisory agent, which
had been submitted on motions for summary judgment, and
determined that: “[T]he only reasonable inference is that had the
plaintiffs stated the truth about Conway, they would not have received
the contract. The plaintiffs have set forth no affirmative evidence
563
such that a reasonable jury could have concluded otherwise.”

558. Id. at 1249. Although the Federal Circuit found that there was an open
question whether federal common law or state law applied to imputation of
knowledge, it nonetheless found that the legal principles were, in this case, largely
identical in federal and state law:
In general, knowledge acquired by an agent acting within the scope of his or
her agency is imputed to the principal and the latter is bound by that
knowledge even if the information is never actually communicated. An
exception to this rule occurs when the agent has abandoned his or her
principal’s interests and is acting entirely for his or her own or another’s
purposes.
Id. (quoting Christopher S. v. Douglaston Club, 713 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) (emphasis omitted)).
559. Id.
560. Id. at 1250.
561. Id. at 1250–51 (citing Godley v. United States, 5 F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir.
1993)) (holding that, for a government contract to be tainted by fraud and, thus,
void ab initio, a causal link between the fraud and the contract must be established).
562. Id.
563. Id. at 1251 (holding that issues of fact are genuine for summary judgment
purposes “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party” (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986))).
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6.

Prior material breach
As an alternative ground for its reversal, the Federal Circuit held
that even if the Assistance Agreement was not void, the doctrine of
564
prior material breach would have precluded plaintiff’s recovery.
Under the doctrine of prior material breach,
when a party to a contract is sued for breach, it may defend on the
ground that there existed a legal excuse for its nonperformance at
the time of the alleged breach. Faced with two parties to a
contract, each of whom claims breach by the other, courts will
“often . . . impose liability on the party that committed the first
565
material breach.”

The Federal Circuit agreed with the government’s argument that
the false certification constituted an uncured material breach for four
566
reasons.
First, because the Assistance Agreement conditioned the
government’s obligations on the receipt of the certification, the
567
falsity of such certification represented a failure of performance.
Second, the thrift’s failure of performance was material given the
facts identified as supporting causation and the case law holding “that
568
Third, the
any degree of fraud is material as a matter of law.”
thrift’s failure of performance was deemed uncured because its
certification was a material condition precedent to the government’s
contractual obligations, and because the trial court found that the
569
government relied on the certification.
Fourth, LISB’s false
570
certification preceded the government’s enactment of FIRREA.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the false certification
constituted a prior material breach which provided an independent
571
basis for precluding a damages award to the plaintiffs.

564. Id.
565. Id. (quoting Barron Bancshares, Inc. v. United States, 366 F.3d 1360, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2004)). The court approvingly cited past precedent that referenced § 237
cmt. b of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, including Barron, 366 F.3d at 1380–
81, and Christopher Village, L.P. v. United States, 360 F.3d 1319, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
566. Long Island III, 503 F.3d at 1251–52.
567. Id. at 1252 & n.4 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235 cmt. a &
b (1981)).
568. Id. at 1252 (quoting Christopher Village, 360 F.3d at 1335).
569. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 (1981)).
570. Id.
571. Id. at 1253.
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IX. SET-OFF
A. J.G.B. Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 497 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
572

In J.G.B. Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit held
that the government could not withhold money owed to a
subcontractor who was also a third-party beneficiary as a way to offset
573
The
a claim the government had against the prime contractor.
plaintiff, J.G.B. Enterprises, Inc. (“JGB”) was a subcontractor to a
contract between Capital City Pipes (“CCP”) and the Defense Supply
574
Center Columbus (“DSCC”).
On October 27, 1999, JGB informed the DSCC contracting officer
that it had not received payment from CCP on several contracts, and
would therefore discontinue all future shipments until the payment
575
problems were sorted out.
On November 2, 1999, the CO
responded that she was aware of the problem and that CCP would be
debarred from government contracting if the payment issues were
576
not resolved. Ultimately, JGB and CCP agreed that an escrow agent
would receive the government’s payments and disburse them to JGB
577
as appropriate. On November 10, 1999, CCP petitioned to have the
remittance address on the contract switched to the escrow agent
578
selected by JGB. When the change in payment arrangements were
579
made, JGB shipped the product to the government.
However, when the government paid JGB, it reduced the payment
to recoup other debts owed to the government by CCP on contracts
580
not involving JGB.
JGB filed suit in the COFC to recover the
581
After trial, the court determined that the
withheld funds.
government did not have set-off rights that permitted the
government to withhold payments to JGB representing amounts
582
owed it by CCP, the prime contractor.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that “the government has the
right to offset debts owed to it by the same contractor absent explicit

572.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.
581.
582.

497 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1260.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1260–61.
Id. at 1261.
Id.
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583

contractual, statutory, or regulatory provisions stating otherwise,”
and that the same right to a set-off extended to any contract between
the contractor and the government, not simply the contract upon
584
which the debt exists.
585
In Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Prosser’s Moving & Storage Co.,
the Supreme Court held that a third-party beneficiary to a contract,
when suing to enforce that contract against a promisor, was subject to
all of the defenses the promisor would have against the original
586
The Federal Circuit, however, distinguished Schneider
promisee.
Moving & Storage Co. from the present case, by stating that the right
of set-off is “not a contract defense,” but instead “a device that
facilitates the efficient reconciliation of competing claims between the
587
same parties.”
Because the right to claim a set-off requires
competing claims between the same parties, the government had to
have a valid claim against JGB, not CCP, in order to set off its
588
payment to JGB.
X. ATTORNEY FEES
A. Hubbard v. United States, 480 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
589

Hubbard v. United States
deals with the proper relationship
between damages received and attorney fees awarded in a contract
suit. In this case, the Federal Circuit vacated an award of $125,186.92
in attorney fees and costs and remanded the case for
590
reconsideration.
In 1984, Bill Hubbard entered into a contract with the government
under which he agreed to build and operate a mini-storage facility at
591
a naval air station. As part of the contract, the Navy was to provide
personnel to operate both the facility and a rental office known as the
583. Id. (citing United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 239 (1947);
Applied Cos. v. United States, 144 F.3d 1470, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
584. Id. (citing Cecile Indus., Inc. v. Cheney, 995 F.2d 1052, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
1993)).
585. 466 U.S. 364 (1984).
586. Id. at 370.
587. J.G.B. Enter., 497 F.3d at 1261–62 (citing Citizen Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516
U.S. 16, 18 (1995)) (“The right of set-off . . . allows entities that owe each other
money to apply their mutual debts against each other, thereby avoiding the absurdity
of making A pay B when B owes A.”).
588. Id. at 1262 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 309 cmt. c (1981))
(“[C]laims and defenses of the promisor against the promisee arising out of separate
transactions do not affect the right of the beneficiary except in accordance with the
terms of the contract.”).
589. 480 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
590. Id. at 1335.
591. Id. at 1329.
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Rent All Center. In return, Hubbard was to give the Navy 17.5% of
593
the business’ gross revenue. In 1993, a new commander of the base
moved the Rent All Center to a new location and took several other
594
actions adverse to Hubbard.
In 1995, Hubbard brought a breach-of-contract action in the
COFC, alleging that the moving of the Rent All Center site, together
with the Navy ending phone service to the rental site before it was
moved, reducing the hours of the Rent All Center, failing to post
signs notifying customers of the new office’s location, allowing
firefighters to conduct training at the facility, and permitting other
contractors to park at the storage facility (which Hubbard alleges
damaged a concrete slab on which Hubbard planned to build
another storage building), violated the Navy’s contractual
595
obligations.
The COFC found the government acted in bad faith in taking
some of these actions and thus breached the contract with
596
Hubbard. The court refused to award Hubbard the $627,000 in lost
profits he sought, ruling that Hubbard failed to show that his losses
597
were caused by the breach. Instead, the court awarded damages of
598
The court
$400, based on the cost of repaving the concrete slab.
held that “[b]ecause of the clear bad faith shown by the Navy . . . Mr.
Hubbard has been forced to appeal to this court . . . . Accordingly,
599
plaintiff is entitled to recover all its attorney costs.” The amount of
the fee and the way it was determined are the principal issues in the
600
appeal.
The EAJA states that “a court shall award to a prevailing party other
than the United States fees and other expenses . . . unless the court
finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified
601
or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”
The
government pressed two arguments on appeal as to why Hubbard was
not entitled to any attorney fees. First, the government argued that
because Hubbard recovered only nominal damages, he should not
602
603
recover attorney fees. The government pointed to Farrar v. Hobby,
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1329–30.
Id. at 1330.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1332.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000).
Hubbard, 480 F.3d at 1331.
506 U.S. 103 (1992).
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where the Supreme Court explained that “[w]hen a plaintiff recovers
only nominal damages . . . the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at
604
However, the Federal Circuit distinguished Farrar, explaining
all.”
that Hubbard’s award could not be termed nominal because “the
$400 damages in this case were not ‘nominal’ in the sense in which
605
Second,
the Supreme Court apparently used that term in Farrar.”
the government challenged the COFC’s finding that the
606
government’s position was not substantially justified.
The Federal
Circuit upheld the COFC’s determination because there was bad
607
faith in the conduct that gave rise to this case.
The Federal Circuit agreed that the attorney fees awarded were
608
609
excessive. The court looked at Hensley v. Eckerhart, which focused
on the relationship between the result of the case and the attorney
fees awarded under the fee-shifting provision of the Civil Rights Act,
and ruled that these principles should also apply to the fee-shifting
610
provision of the EAJA. Hensley stated that the “most useful starting
point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number
of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
611
reasonable hourly rate.” After satisfying this first step, a court must
look to a number of factors to see if the award should be increased or
612
As Hensley explained, “the most critical factor is the
decreased.
613
degree of success obtained.”
Using Hensley as a guide, the Federal Circuit found that while the
trial court completed the first step of the Hensley analysis, it failed to
determine if there were circumstances present that would render the
614
award excessive.
The bad faith shown by the government in the
pre-litigation phase of this case did not erase the fact that Hubbard
615
was not successful in this case.
Hubbard asked the trial court for
616
The
damages in the amount of $627,000 but received only $400.
604. Id. at 104.
605. Hubbard, 480 F.3d at 1332 (explaining that the “nominal damages” at issue in
Farrar—damages awarded when the plaintiff has established the merits of the claim
but have shown no real injury—are different from the “nominal damages” at issue in
a case like Hubbard, where the plaintiff proved real injury but could not prove the
exact amount).
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. Id. at 1334.
609. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
610. Hubbard, 480 F.3d at 1332–33.
611. Id. at 1332 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).
612. Id.
613. Id. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436).
614. Id. at 1333.
615. Id.
616. Id.
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$110,000 attorney’s fee was 275 times greater than the amount of the
recovery, and no explanation existed as to how the fee was reasonable
617
“in light of ‘the degree of success obtained.’”
B. Centex Corp. v. United States, 486 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007); First
Heights Bank, FSB v. United States, 486 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
In this consolidated appeal, the Federal Circuit held that an award
of attorney fees for “bad faith” conduct was not available when the
618
conduct related to the substantive claim of the party seeking fees.
In so doing, the court upheld the COFC’s denial of attorney fees
sought by plaintiffs who argued that the government acted in bad
faith both before and after the enactment of the “Guarini
Amendment,” which eliminated certain favorable tax treatment that
plaintiffs received in exchange for acquiring failing thrifts insured by
619
the government.
Under the common law “American Rule,” a party generally may
not collect its attorney fees from the loser, but fee-shifting is
permitted under certain exceptions, including when the prevailing
620
party’s opponent has acted in bad faith. The trial court held that it
could not consider government agents’ pre-1993 conduct because it
621
was extrajudicial, meaning it did not implicate the judicial process.
Instead, the “primary conduct” of the government agents in
promoting the Guarini Amendment related to the substantive claim
622
of the plaintiffs. Awarding attorney fees in this instance, according
to the trial court, would frustrate the intent of the American Rule to
protect a defendant’s right to argue a nonfrivolous defense to a
623
claim, even if the claim arose from bad faith conduct. The Federal
Circuit agreed with the COFC that “authorizing a court to shift fees
based solely on bad faith conduct that forms the basis for the
substantive claim for relief would undermine the American Rule by

617. Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436).
618. Centex Corp. v. United States, 486 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
619. Id. Previously, the plaintiffs prevailed on their claim that Congress’s
enactment of the Guarini Amendment breached their contracts with the government
and were awarded damages. Id. (citing First Heights Bank, FSB v. United States, 422
F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
620. Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247,
259 (1975)).
621. Id.
622. Id. at 1371–72.
623. Id. at 1372 (citing Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 744 F.2d
1226, 1231 (6th Cir. 1984)).
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penalizing a party who raises good faith defenses to claims of liability
624
for bad faith conduct.”
C. Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff, 482 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
On petition for rehearing, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its prior
625
holding in Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff (Richlin I) that EAJA
allows recovery of paralegal fees as “expenses” and not as part of
“attorney’s fees,” and that recovery for paralegal fees is limited to the
626
attorney’s costs, not market rates.
The Federal Circuit’s prior
627
holding was contrary to that of the Eleventh Circuit. In its petition
for rehearing, Richlin claimed that other circuits followed the
Eleventh Circuit approach and, accordingly, the Federal Circuit was
628
in conflict with those circuits as well. However, the Federal Circuit
distinguished these cases by noting that the cases appeared to have
only addressed the issue of whether paralegal fees were available at all
under EAJA, rather than whether they are “expenses” or “attorney’s
629
630
fees.” The Circuit denied the request for rehearing. Judge Plager
dissented on the basis of his previous dissent in the underlying
opinion, concluding that paralegal services should be compensated
631
Judge Plager found that the
based upon prevailing market rates.
majority opinion was “at variance with Supreme Court law” which
interpreted a reasonable attorney’s fee to compensate not only work
performed personally by members of the bar, but also the work of
others whose labor contributed to the attorney work product billed to
632
the client. The United States Supreme Court granted a petition for
633
a writ of certiorari.

624. Id.
625. 472 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
626. Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff (Richlin II), 482 F.3d 1358, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
627. Id. (citing Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 778 (11th Cir. 1988), aff’d on other
grounds, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990)).
628. Id. (citing Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 974 (D.C. Cir.
2004); Hyatt v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 239, 255 (4th Cir. 2002); Stockton v. Shalala, 36
F.3d 49, 50 (8th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Alamo, 983 F.2d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 1993)).
629. Id.
630. Id.
631. Id. at 1360.
632. Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff (Richlin I), 472 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (Plager, J., dissenting).
633. Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 128 S. Ct. 3023 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2007) (No.
06-1717).
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CONCLUSION
Several of the Federal Circuit’s government contract decisions
issued in 2007 are noteworthy. Of major significance in the
jurisdictional area are two developments. First, in Suburban Mortgage,
the Federal Circuit altered the analytical framework for assessing
whether jurisdiction lies in the COFC under the Tucker Act or in the
634
district courts under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Because
the Federal Circuit is the sole appellate tribunal resolving appeals of
district court transfer orders, Suburban Mortgage should eliminate
some of the jurisdictional uncertainty which has plagued litigants and
the lower courts.
Also of paramount importance in the jurisdictional arena is a
decision by the Supreme Court in John R. Sand & Gravel, affirming
the Federal Circuit’s holding that the statute of limitations governing
635
actions in the COFC, 28 U.S.C. § 2501, is jurisdictional.
This
decision too will have important ramifications for practitioners. A
plaintiff will have the burden of proving the timeliness of its action in
establishing jurisdiction. Trial courts must sua sponte examine
whether an action is timely filed under the statute of limitations as
part of ascertaining their own jurisdiction. In addition, the prospect
of applying the doctrine of equitable tolling to § 2501 does not look
636
promising in the wake of this opinion.
The court also clarified certain aspects of government contract law.
In bid protests, Blue & Gold Fleet makes it clear that a protestor
challenging a solicitation must do so prior to the end of the bidding
637
process. In the area of damages, the court gave helpful guidance in
two respects. In the Winstar context, the Court clarified that trial
courts have the discretion to employ either the “but for” or the
“substantial factor” standard for causation. Grumman drove home the
reality that concrete evidence is required before a trial tribunal can
employ the jury verdict method of assessing damages even when
638
liability has been demonstrated.
634. Suburban Mortgage Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480
F.3d 1116, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see discussion supra Part I.A.
635. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, No. 06-1164, 2008 WL 65445, at
*2 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2008).
636. In discussing the “jurisdictional” type of limitations statutes, the John R. Sand
& Gravel Court stated: “[t]he Court has often read the time limits of these statutes as
more absolute, say as requiring a court to decide a timeliness question despite a
waiver, or as forbidding a court to consider whether certain equitable considerations
warrant extending a limitations period.” Id. at *3.
637. Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
see discussion supra Part II.B.
638. Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Wynne, 497 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
see discussion supra Part VII.C.
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Three additional decisions could have ramifications for
government contract practitioners. In the area of authority, Winter v.
Cath teaches that the court will weigh strict adherence to contractual
639
Long Island Savings Bank
clauses more heavily than the equities.
held that the bank’s Winstar contract was tainted by fraud based upon
conduct of its CEO in receiving kickbacks from his law firm for
640
directing the bank’s mortgage closing work the law firm’s way.
Given this fraud, the court found the Winstar goodwill contract void
ab initio, precluding any recovery, and reversing the COFC’s award of
641
In so holding, the Federal Circuit articulated
some $435 million.
an expansive view of the type of conduct which can void a contract ab
642
initio—a view in direct conflict with that of the D.C. Circuit. Finally,
under Carabetta, the sovereign acts doctrine will not relieve the
government of its contractual responsibilities when substitute
643
performance is available.

639. Winter v. Cath-dr/Balti Joint Venture, 497 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see
discussion supra Part VI.A.
640. Long Island Sav. Bank, FSB (Long Island III) v. United States, 503 F.3d 1234
(Fed. Cir. 2007); see discussion supra Part VIII.C.
641. Long Island III, 503 F.3d at 1237.
642. Id. at 1245–46 (citing United States v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d
1372, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
643. Carabetta Enters., Inc. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see
discussion supra Part VIII.A.

